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1. Introduction
With labor productivity and real wages lagging in the United States since the mid-1970s
and  inequality  on  the rise, many have questioned what has gone wrong.  The vibrant American
economy  of  the  immediate  post-World  War  II  era  appears  sluggish.  Labor productivity was
equally sluggish during other periods, although none lasted as long as the current slowdown.
The recent rise in inequality has returned the nation=s wage structure to that experienced around
1940 rather than introducing inequality of unprecedented proportions.
Most  relevant  to  placing  the  current  labor  market  in  a  long-run  perspective  is  that  labor
gained  enormously  during  the  past  hundred  years.  Some of the gain was reaped through real
hourly  wage  increases  and enhanced employer-provided benefits.  Some came in the form of
decreased  hours  per  week  and  decreased  years  of  work over the lifetime.  Still other gains
accrued to labor in the form of greater security in the face of unemployment, old age, sickness,
and job injury.  Many of these gains were obtained when labor unions were weak.  That is not to
say that organized labor added little to labor=s increased economic welfare over the past hundred
years.  Unionized labor earned between 5 and 20 percent more than nonunionized labor, of equal
skill, during most of the period, and nonunionized labor in America may have benefited from the
Avoice@  of  unionized  labor,  particularly  with  regard to hours reductions.  But there is no hard
evidence  that  the  American  labor market was fundamentally transformed by unions in the same
manner  that  European  labor  markets,  with their institutional wage setting, employment security
laws, mandated works councils, and centralization of collective bargaining, have been.
Across  the  past  hundred  years  the  face  of  the  American  labor  force  has been radically
altered.  Child labor was virtually eliminated, the labor force participation of the aged was
sharply  reduced,  and  women  increased  their  participation.  Whereas women were only 18
percent of the labor force in 1900 and most were either young or old, they are now almost halfGoldin -2-
the  labor  force  and  their  age  distribution resembles that of the male labor force.  The rise of
women=s  employment,  in  terms  of  its  quantitative  impact  and  by  virtue of its social implications,
could  rightly  be  considered  the  most  significant  among  the  three  major  demographic  changes
considered here.  All three changes have, by and large, come about because of secular changes in
labor  supply  and  not  by  dint  of  legislated  constraints  on  labor  supply.  Legislation was often
reinforcing,  as  in  compulsory  education, child labor laws, equal opportunity and affirmative
action, and the Social Security Act.  But long-term forces had already been set in motion before
legislation and provided a far greater share of total change.
Finally, the labor market itself has been altered over the course of the past century.  In
1910 27 percent of all male workers in the manufacturing sector reported their usual occupation
as Alaborer@ and 30 percent in the transportation sector did (U.S. Department of Commerce 1914,
p. 53).  Yet others in both sectors were unskilled even though their occupational title was not that
of  Alaborer.@   Many of them were initially hired for brief stints.  Substantial seasonality in
employment,  cyclical  downturns,  and  general  business  failures  resulted  in  job  dismissals  and
layoffs.  Workers today have no assurances of job security, but they do have considerably more
protection  and  expectation  of employment continuity than workers did a century ago.  Although
young  workers  today  often  choose  to  leave  their  jobs  to  seek  better opportunities, they build
more job tenure when older than did comparable workers a century ago. 
It  might  be  incorrect  to  characterize labor markets in the past as theoretically-conceived
Aspot@  markets,  since  wages  did  not  adjust  instantaneously  and  markets  did  not  clear
continuously.  But such labor markets had attributes far more characteristic of  Aspot@  markets
than do labor markets today.  The growing skill content of work has transformed labor market
institutions.  Workers today have more formal schooling than in the past, and education interacts
positively  with on-the-job training.  Workers, it is believed, accumulate more skills today thatGoldin -3-
are  specific  to  particular firms than they did a century ago.  With more specificity of skill and
higher levels of skill, both workers and firms have a greater interest in long-term relationships.
Labor  markets  in  the  late  twentieth  century  differ  from  those  a  century  ago  in  several
other  dimensions.  The greater centralization of hiring and firing authority has meant less
discretion  given  to  supervisors  and  foremen  and  more  rules.  Managers today use fewer sticks,
such as the discharge of workers and the docking of pay, and more carrots, such as promotion
and bonuses than they did a century ago.  Although the rationalization of hiring, promoting, and
firing  evolved over time, these changes have been reinforced by a more regulated and litigious
environment.
The  evolution  of  modern  labor  market  institutions  has  affected  both individual well-being
and  the  macroeconomy.  Workers have more job security and more ability to make firm and
industry-specific  investments  in  job  training.  Thus modern labor market institutions put in place
because  of  greater  worker  skill  have also encouraged skill acquisition.  But many question
whether  modern  labor  market  institutions  render  the  market  less  flexible,  make wages more
rigid, and result in more unemployment rather than less.  Evidence on the variance of wages by
industry for the period from 1860 to 1983 suggests that wages became more rigid sometime after
World  War  II  (Allen  1987).  But other evidence points to wage rigidities in the manufacturing
sector that were in place by the 1890s (Sundstrom 1990).
Unemployment  levels  and  unemployment  volatility  have  not  increased  substantially over
time, but the distribution of unemployment has become more skewed.
1  A greater fraction of the
unemployed  today  than  in  the  past  are  out  of  work for long periods.  Some of the difference
owes to the greater seasonality of labor demand in the past and thus to the larger proportion of
the unemployed who used to be out of work for brief spells.  Some is probably due to the adventGoldin -4-
of  unemployment  insurance  enabling  workers  to  search longer.  The increase in long-term
unemployment remains perplexing and disturbing.
The growth in labor=s standard of living and well-being across the twentieth century was
not always shared equally by skill, region, race, and sex.  The wage structure probably widened
until  sometime  in  the  second  or  third  decades  of  this  century,  although  the  evidence  is  still
inconclusive.  The evidence is clear that the wage structure narrowed rapidly in the 1940s and
then  remained  relatively  stable  from  1950  to  the  mid-1970s.  The wage structure expanded
significantly since then becoming as unequal by 1994 as it was 55 years ago.  We know far less
about  the  conjectured  widening  of  the  wage  structure  from the late-nineteenth century to the
1920s.  The arrival of vast numbers of lesser-skilled immigrant men in the 1900 to 1914 period
probably  depressed  the  wages  of  unskilled  men  and  may  also  have lowered the wages of the
skilled  in  industries  capable  of  adopting  the assembly-line machinery of that era.  There is also
evidence that immigrants put downward pressure on the wages of craft workers, such as building
tradesmen.  The growth of big business with its demands for office and other white-collar
workers would also have worked to widen skill differentials in the early twentieth century before
high school enrollment soared in the 1920s.
Regional  disparities in wages and the rural-urban differential diminished over time.
Racial differences narrowed when the general wage structure was compressed in the 1940s and
again in the mid-1960s to the 1970s.  The ratio of male to female full-time earnings decreased
during  several  periods  in  the  twentieth  century.  But the periods differ from those of racial and
general wage structure narrowing because sex differences are affected, in a complex manner, by
changes  in  the  participation  of  women  in  the  labor  force.  To summarize, wage differences by
region,  sex,  and  race  narrowed  over  the  past  century,  but  the  wage  structure  for  all  Americans
probably  first  widened,  then  narrowed  substantially  in  the  1940s,  before  widening  again  in  theGoldin -5-
post-1975 period.  Although the returns to education generally follow a path similar to that of the
entire  wage  structure,  there  is  evidence  that  the  wage  premium  to  ordinary white collar work
declined in the early 1920s (Goldin and Katz 1995).
Wage  differences  by  industry  C  termed  the  interindustry  wage differential  C  have
existed  at  least  for  the  past  fifty,  and  possibly  one  hundred,  years.  Particular industries pay
higher  wages  across  the  skill  hierarchy,  given  worker characteristics.  Such differences
apparently  defy  the  notion  that  labor  markets  clear  since,  presumably,  employers ought to be
indifferent  between  hiring  workers  having  identical  observable  characteristics.  The existence of
wages apparently above the market-clearing level has been offered in support of the notion that
wages serve purposes other than that of clearing markets and that there is not one labor market
but many noncompeting ones.  AGood@ jobs, it is claimed, offer wages above the market-clearing
level  as  an  incentive  for  workers  to  reduce  turnover,  shirking,  and  malfeasance,  and  to  increase
effort.  Because industries having more concentrated product markets are disproportionately
those  with  higher  wages,  the  interindustry  wage  differential  could  also indicate that some
industry rents accrue to labor.
Government  intervention  in  the  labor  market,  both  at  the state and federal levels has
emerged  with increasing importance and significance across the past hundred years and has
taken  numerous  forms.  There has been legislation establishing social insurance (e.g.,
Unemployment  Insurance,  Social  Security  Act,  and  Workers=  Compensation  at  the  state  level),
protecting workers (e.g., Occupational Safety and Health Administration [OSHA], child labor
laws),  enabling  and defining union activity (e.g., Wagner Act), restricting laborer=s  wage  and
hours  contracts  (e.g.,  the  minimum  wage and overtime payment sections in the Fair Labor
Standards  Act),  and  limiting  competition  from abroad (e.g., 1924 and 1929 National Origins
Acts  restricting  immigration).  Much of this chapter will put forward the case that, with someGoldin -6-
exceptions,  labor=s  gains  and  labor  market  changes  over  the  past  century  have,  by  and  large,
arisen from an unrestricted, laissez faire market.
Yet policy interventions seem far reaching.  How, then, can one claim that the bulk of
labor=s  gains  and  labor  market  evolutions  would  have  occurred in the absence of legislation?
Government intervention often reinforced existing trends, as in the decline of child labor, the
narrowing  of  the  wage  structure,  and  the  decrease  in  hours  of  work.  Legislation often enabled
the completion of markets that are more viable today than in the past, such as those for insurance
and  pensions.  In several cases, legislation may have had unintended consequences, such as in
the  increase  in  industrial  accidents, in certain industries, with the implementation of Workers=
Compensation laws in the various states.
It  should  be  emphasized  that  while  the  majority of labor=s  gains  and  changes  in  labor
force  participation  would  have  occurred  without  legislation,  legislation  was  enabling  and  often
did make a difference.  Black-white differences in incomes, for example, were narrowed by the
1964 Civil Rights Act and by affirmative action and federal contract compliance.  Hours declines
in  the  1910s  and 1920s occurred in states having maximum hours legislation affecting women
only (Goldin 1988).
Oddly  enough,  given  the  many  impressive  pieces  of  legislation  that  have  affected labor,
two less obvious ones probably had the greatest impact on labor=s overall gains.  One is publicly-
provided  education  particularly  at  the  secondary-school  level,  and the other is immigration
restriction.  Publicly-funded schools cheapened the cost of education through scale economies, it
redistributed  income  through  taxation, and it encouraged the schooling of children from poor
families  by  its  free  provision.
2  European immigration restriction legislation came first in the
form of the literacy test in 1917 and later through quotas in 1921, 1924, and 1929.  The quotas
kept the masses at bay when decreased ocean transport and railroad fares would have enabledGoldin -7-
international  labor  mobility  on  an even grander scale than during the height of immigration in
the early 1900s.  It was also a time when the goods produced by low-wage countries were poor
substitutes  for those produced in the United States, quite unlike circumstances today.  In the
absence  of  aggressive  policy  in  these  two  areas, particularly education, the labor market would
have evolved very differently.
The  history  of  the  past  century  seems  to  be  coming  full  circle in various ways.
Unionization  in  the  private  sector  has  returned  to  the  level  achieved  immediately before the
Wagner Act.  Net immigration as a percentage of net population growth is at historic levels and
exceeds that at the turn of the century.  The wage structure has stretched significantly and may
be as wide as at its peak, sometime in the 1920s or 1930s.  Inequality, it should be noted, has
also  widened  in  many  other  OECD  countries  but  the  increase  in  America  far exceeds that
elsewhere.  American business currently claims that U.S. high schools produce workers with
inadequate basic skills for a high-tech work place.  Their arguments echo those made in the early
1900s just before the United States expanded its educational system at the secondary level and
embraced  educational  tracking  but  not  a  multi-tiered  system  with  industrial  training,  as  existed  in
Germany.  Finally, the rate of labor productivity advance and wage growth for low-wage
workers during the past 15 years looks more like that achieved sometime during 1900 to 1920
than in the three decades following World War II.
Many claim that the ills of the American economy in the 1990s are legacies of the period
when  we  first  rose  to  world  industrial supremacy.  We achieved leadership around 1910 and
maintained  it,  in  part,  through  our  pioneering  techniques  using  large  scale,  mass  production, and
the assembly line.  Through an intricate division of labor, lesser-skilled labor was substituted for
higher-skilled  workers.
3  Some assert, however, that these methods, often still practiced in the
United States, are out of touch with the technologies of the 1990s, and that small scale, flexibleGoldin -8-
production, worker-management teams, and skilled labor make for success in today's work place
(Marshall and Tucker 1992).
In sum, the past hundred years have witnessed enormous gains in wages and leisure and
significant shifts in the composition of the labor force.  Despite the rise (and subsequent decline)
of private-sector unions and the increased interference and activity of government, the vast
majority of the gains to workers and changes in the labor force can be attributed to fundamental
advances  in  technology.  Technological change has increased the skill component of the work
place,  decreased the relative demand for child labor, raised women=s  wages  relative  to  men=s,
and decreased the price of home-produced goods, to mention just a few of the ways technology
has altered the work place and the home.  Government and unions shaped the labor force during
the past century, but their roles have been less fundamental than in other OECD countries.
4
The  defense  of  these  many  characterizations  begins  with  a  description  of  the  labor  force
C its composition, sectoral distribution, gains in the form of wages and hours, and labor force
participation by age and sex.  Unionization trends, and comparisons with the European case, are
then  discussed  including  why  America  never  had  a  social  democratic  party,  that  is  why  there  is
AAmerican  exceptionalism.@  The organization of the labor market and the possible shift from a
Aspot@ to a contractual labor market is discussed, and changes in unemployment across the past
century  are  assessed.  Long-term trends in the wage structure and inequality in general are the
next topic.  Finally, the role of government intervention is evaluated.Goldin -9-
2. Composition of the Labor Force and Its Sectoral Distribution
The  Alabor  force@  today  is  defined  as  all  individuals (above some age) working for pay
and,  if  unemployed,  those  seeking work during the survey week of the Current Population
Survey  (a  related  definition  exists  for  the self-employed).
5  The modern definition of the labor
force took form with the 1940 federal population census.  Before 1940 the population census
asked for one=s usual occupation, not whether one was employed during a specific time period.
Thus, prior to 1940 the labor force is defined as all individuals who reported an occupation on
the  federal  population  census.  These individuals were considered  Againfully  employed,@  and
thus the labor force construct before 1940 is termed gainful employment.
The  labor  force  concept  before  1940  is  not  an  unambiguous  one.  An individual who
worked only a few weeks over the year might have reported an occupation, as might one who
was long retired.  A married woman who sewed for pay in her home every week of the year
might not have reported an occupation, whereas an unmarried woman who worked in a factory
20 weeks during the year might have.  There is probably no serious problem of enumeration for
the adult male labor force prior to 1940.  But there could be for women and youth, particularly in
cities  having  industrial home work and large numbers of boarding houses, and in cotton, dairy,
and fruit-growing farm areas.
6
Several  important trends are obvious in Table 1, which summarizes changes in the
demographic composition of the labor force over the past hundred years.  Women gained on men
in their proportion of the labor force, rising from 17 percent to 45 percent.  In large measure the
increase in the ratio was due to the expansion of the female labor force.  But the relative increase
of women compared with men was reinforced by a decline in the participation of men at older
ages and, more recently, by declines for men in other portions of the age distribution.  Second,
the labor force was reduced at both the older and younger ages, with the rise of retirement andGoldin -10-
the increase in secondary and higher education.  Finally, with the end of open immigration at the
close of World War I, the proportion of the labor force that was foreign born declined.  In 1890
26  percent  of  the  male  non-farm labor force was foreign born.  By 1940 the figure was 11
percent, and in 1980, even including the illegal immigrant population, it was only 7 percent (not
in table).
The broad outlines of the maturing economy  C the relative decline in agriculture and rise
of the tertiary (service) sector C are apparent in Tables 2, 3, and 4, which give the industrial and
occupational distributions of the labor force.  Sectoral changes for employees on non-agricultural
payrolls  are  given  in  Table  2.  Manufacturing employment (including both production and non-
production workers), as a fraction of non-agricultural employees, decreased by 50 percent during
past  century  and  is  only  17  percent  of  the  labor  force today.  Government increased by two
times, rising from 7.2 percent to 16.7 percent.  All services increased by one and one-half times,
whereas the goods producing sector decreased by one-half.
Occupational  distributions  for  the  entire  labor  force and by sex for the non-farm labor
force  are given in Tables 3 and 4.  White-collar employment rose thirteen-fold from 1900 to
1990 whereas employment in the nation as a whole increased by four times.  Thus 17.6 percent
of labor force participants were white-collar workers in 1900 but 57.1 percent were by 1990 (see
Table  3).  Because the manual and service-worker groups grew at about the national average
from 1900 to 1980, the decline of the farm sector during that period was exactly offset by the
rise of the white-collar sector.  Important movements occurred within the manual and service
group.  Private household workers declined relative to the total, and at times declined absolutely.
But  service  workers,  excluding  those  in  private  households,  increased  more  than  eight times
from  1900  to  1970,  causing  their  share  of  the  total  to  rise  from  3.6  percent  to  11.2  percent.
7
Among manual workers, the generic Alaborer@ category decreased from 12.5 percent to about 4Goldin -11-
percent (from 25 percent to 7 percent among men) reflecting both the substitution of capital for
labor=s brawn and the greater skill content of even manual work.
Within the non-farm sector, white-collar jobs grew relative to blue-collar jobs, so that by
1990 more than half of all American workers were so employed, 46 percent for males and 71
percent for females (see Table 4).  The largest increases were recorded in the clerical sector, and
it was women, not men, whose gains in office work were the greatest.  In 1900 just 5 percent of
all  female  employees  were  office  workers  (adding  together  the  clerical  and  sales  categories),
whereas in 1990 40 percent were.  The relative growth of the managerial group, apparent in the
data for the past twenty years, is virtually absent during the preceding seventy years.
Self-employment,  even  within  the  non-farm sector, decreased across the twentieth
century (see Table 5).  Because self-employment is positively related to age and because the age
distribution  of  the  population  changed  over  time,  Table  5  shows  self-employment tabulated by
age.  In 1910 21.5 percent of all males in the non-farm labor force were self employed.  The
figure decreased to 14.9 percent by 1940, and by 1990 it was 12.5 percent.   Self-employment
also decreased within each of the age groups from 1910 to 1990.
Not  only  were  Americans  increasingly  working  for  others,  they  were  also  employed  in
ever-larger  employment  groups  to  about the late 1960s.  The median American production
worker  in  1899  was  employed  by  a  manufacturing  enterprise that hired 22 other production
workers  (see  Table 6).  By 1967 the figure was more than double that.  For all workers,
production  and  nonproduction,  the  figure  almost  tripled during the same period, although it has,
more  recently,  begun  to decline.  The proportion of all manufacturing workers who are
production  workers  declined  over  time,  with the growth of sales and office work forces, falling
from 93 percent in 1899 to about 70 percent in 1982.Goldin -12-
Thus  the  changing occupational distribution of male and female workers across the past
century  reflects  the  decline  in  agriculture,  the  rise  of  white-collar work, and the shift within
manual  employment  away  from  Alaborers@ and within the service sector away from private-
household employment.  Among female workers the two most important changes are the rise of
the  clerical sector and the decline in private household workers.  Because office workers
increased from 5 percent of non-farm female workers to about 35 percent in 1970, and female





Real  annual wages increased during much of the past hundred years for most American
workers.  The series for all manufacturing workers is graphed in Figure 1.
9  The increase from
1900 to 1929 was 1.43 percent average annually, whereas that from 1948 to 1973 was 2.35
percent  average  annually.  After about 1973 the rate slowed to 0.46 percent average annually.
The Great Depression and World War II punctuate the series, and one cannot be certain when the
upturn in the growth rate in wages would have occurred in their absence.  The Agolden age@ of
manufacturing wage growth was the post-World War II era extending from about 1948 to 1973.
Much of the discussion concerning the current economic malaise is couched in terms of
the  slowdown  in  real  non-farm  labor  productivity.  Labor productivity is defined here as total
product divided by all non-farm hours of work, and the (natural log) of this variable is graphed
in  Figure  2.  The graph displays some of the underlying features of Figure 1 (real annual
earnings in the manufacturing sector)  C  a  quickening  pace  of  productivity  following  World  War
II and a slowing of growth sometime around 1970.  But the hourly labor productivity graph lacksGoldin -13-
the enormous decrease during the 1930s in the annual earnings.  It also does not display as sharp
an increase in the post-World War II period.  The reason is mainly found in hours of work per
employed  individual,  which plummeted in the 1930s.  Further, those who were laid off during
the  1930s  were  less  educated  and  probably  less  skilled  in  other  ways than those who were
retained.  Thus productivity grew during the 1930s at a rate greater than that for the 1920s,
although  real  annual  earnings  for  employed  workers  in  manufacturing did not grow in the
1930s.
10
Non-farm labor productivity grew at about 2 percent average annually during the 1890 to
1930s period, increased to 2.34 percent in the 1945 to 1972 period, and plummeted to less than 1
percent annual growth since 1973.  There were major ups and downs within these broad outlines.
Non-farm labor productivity was about as sluggish in the 1907 to 1916 and mid-1920s to early
1930s periods as in the post-1970s (note that the slopes of the labor productivity index are about
the  same  for  these periods).  Interestingly, at least two of these periods were also ones of
decreased relative earnings of low-wage workers.
Lower-skilled  groups  were  a  major  portion of the labor force early in this century.
Among men, 25 percent of all non-farm workers were reported as Alaborers@ in 1900 (see Table
4) and about 10 percent more were similarly unskilled but had other job titles.
11  It is instructive,
therefore, to observe how the weekly wage rate changed for this group relative to that for all
manufacturing workers.  Figure 3 shows that the two lines edge upward from 1900 until 1907/08
when both decrease with the nation-wide economic recession.  That for the lower skilled group
then drifts downward, departing from that for all manufacturing workers which continues to rise.
With the onset of World War I, however, the lower skilled series soars (but note the caution in
Figure 3 regarding comparisons between the two series).Goldin -14-
Contemporary  commentators blamed the relative decline in the earnings of the lower
skilled,  after  1909,  on  the  ever-increasing  supply  of  immigrant  labor.  Recent econometric
evidence,  which shows that wages for certain occupations declined with increased immigration,
lends some support to this view, although wages in various high-skilled building trades were also
negatively  affected (Goldin 1994).  The impact of immigration on the wages of native-born
workers for the period before the quotas is still not fully understood.  The enhanced demand for
unskilled  labor  during  World  War  I  and  the  relative  flexibility  of lower-skilled wages reduced
the  skill  differential that had developed.  The narrowing was reinforced by sharply curtailed
immigration during World War I and by the ending of open immigration with the quotas in 1921.
Long-run series for other occupational groups, particularly white-collar workers, have
also  been  assembled,  often  for  periods  briefer than the full century.  Wage series for some
professions  (e.g.,  teachers,  engineers, associate professors) give ambiguous trends relative to all
workers.  A recent wage series for ordinary white-collar workers (e.g.,  stenographers,
bookkeepers,  typists)  gives  an  unambiguous  result,  however.  That series plummets just after
World War I, relative to that of production workers in manufacturing (Goldin and Katz 1995).
The narrowing is apparent for males and females separately and for particular occupations.  Even
when the series is expanded to include managers, it declines rapidly.  One possibility is that prior
to  the  expansion  of  secondary  schooling  in the first decades of the twentieth century, ordinary
white-collar workers were  Anon-competing  groups@  and  earned  substantial  premia  (Douglas
1930).  The expansion of secondary schooling, and of proprietary commercial schools, vastly
increased  the  supply  of  potential  ordinary  white-collar  workers.  Their relative wages, therefore,
fell.  In the discussion on inequality a related series for white-collar workers, extending from the
early 1920s to the 1950s, is presented.
BenefitsGoldin -15-
The wage or salary received by labor is but one part of labor=s compensation for working.
Benefits  form  another.  Employers contribute to government social insurance programs, such as
social  security and unemployment insurance, and to private pensions, health insurance, and life
insurance,  among  others.  The fraction of total employee compensation accounted for by these
supplements to wages and salaries has grown steadily and enormously over time.  From 1929,
the  earliest  date  for  which  the  National  Income  and  Product  Accounts  contain  such  information,
to the early 1980s, the fraction increased from just over 0.01 to about 0.17.  That is, in 1980 17
percent  of  total  compensation  (direct  payments  and  employer  contributions)  was  accounted  for
by employer contributions.  The fastest growth was in the 1970s (see Figure 4).  Although the
graph jumps around a bit before 1950, there is no apparent deviation from trend during World
War II, as is often claimed.
Hours
The  previous  discussion  of  labor=s  rewards  concerned  compensation in the forms of
earnings and benefits.  But hours of work per week decreased substantially during the first few
decades  of  this  century.  Further, paid vacation and sick leave emerged thereby reducing the
number of weeks worked per year given labor=s compensation package.  Labor=s gains, therefore,
were in the forms of increased real earnings, enhanced benefits, and more leisure time.  Figure 5
presents several time series on hours of work.  The series reach far back to the early nineteenth
century  to  provide  continuity  and  to  emphasize the remarkable decline in hours of work in the
1900 to 1933 period.
Hours  of  work  in  manufacturing  were  about  70  in 1830 and declined to 60 by 1860,
remaining  at  that  level  until  the  mid-1890s.  The decrease after 1900 is nothing short of
spectacular.  Ten hours, or one full day of work, were eliminated from the average work week
during 1900 to 1920.  Part of the decline was due to a reduction in hours per day.  But a largeGoldin -16-
fraction was because the work week had been reduced from six to five and a half or even five
days.  The forty-hour work week of the post-World War II era was put in place during the Great
Depression.  It is likely that had it not been for the job-stretching hours declines during the
1930s,  the  decrease  would  have  been  more  gradual.  Because the post-1940 Owen series of
Figure  5  is  for  non-student  males,  the  rise  of  women=s  participation  and  the  increase in college
attendance do not directly affect the trend in hours worked.  Although the Owen series levels off
after World War II, labor force participation rates of males have continued to decrease and paid
vacations and sick leave have expanded.  Hours of work per week may have remained constant,
but  weeks worked over the year and years worked over one=s  lifetime  have  continued  to
decrease.
4. Labor Force Participation: The Face of Labor
The labor force was younger in 1900 than it was nearly a century later in 1990, yet it also
included  a  greater  fraction  of  older  Americans  than  in  1990.  It also contained a greater
percentage  who  were  foreign born and disproportionately more males than in 1990.  Some of
these  changed  features  reflect  the  composition of the population, which was younger and more
foreign born.  Some, however, reveal the labor supply decisions of a poorer population, with less
old-age security, fewer years of schooling, and higher fertility than today.
The median age of the population older than 14 years was about 30 in 1900 compared
with 40 in 1990.  But even had the age structure of the population remained the same across the
century,  labor  force participation rates by age for the male and female populations would have
made the labor force younger in 1900 than in 1990, even though older Americans also
participated far more in 1900 than later.  Teenagers and young adults had higher participation
rates in 1900 than in 1990, and child labor was more extensive.
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Child Labor
Child  labor  C  defined  here  as  the  employment  of  youths less than sixteen years old  C
was  common  in  1900 in particular industrial settings, such as textiles, and in agriculture.
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Although  the  industrial  employment  of  children  increased  with  the  immigrant  waves  from
southern, central, and eastern Europe in the post-1890s era, it had already declined considerably
by 1880.  In 1880 and in 1900, about 25 percent of all male children ten to fifteen years old had
an  occupation  listed  for  them  in  the  census  (see  Table  7).  The percentage increased slightly
between  the two dates.  But the proportion of working children engaged in agriculture fell and
child  labor  was  more  extensive  in  farm  regions than in non-farm areas.  Child labor, therefore,
must have increased between 1880 and 1900 in certain industries, possibly those that employed
recent immigrants.  It was the existence of such child labor that incited progressive reformers to
call for a federal child labor law.
The  high  school  was  just  beginning  to  emerge  across  the country in 1900 and in its
absence  teenagers  either  worked  for  pay,  engaged in household production, or enjoyed leisure.
Young women in 1900, even in the nation=s  large  cities,  often  reported  that  they,  like  their
mothers, were Aat home.@  Rather than being members of the leisure class, they were apprentices
in their future trade C housework.  Young men in 1900, however, generally began work at 15
years  old.  Because most married women did not work for pay in 1900, the vast majority of
working  women  were  young  adults.  Women were 18 percent of the labor force in 1900 (see
Table 1) and were an added factor in the youthfulness of the work force at the time.
As  the high school expanded, the age at which paid employment commenced rose.
Outside the South, high school graduation became the norm for the 18-year old American by the
mid-1930s.  Compulsory schooling laws existed in virtually every state by the early 1900s, and
these laws gained more force in the early twentieth century when minimum ages were increased,Goldin -18-
mandated  yearly  attendance  was  lengthened,  and  enforcement  was  strengthened.  Whether
compulsory  schooling  laws  served  to  increase  the  educational  attainment of American youth and
decreased labor force participation is still an open question, but mounting evidence suggests that
they were not.  Laws in many states were passed after large gains in enrollment and seem to have
lagged  rather than led the high school movement.  Furthermore, practically no state had a
compulsory  schooling  law  that  mandated attendance by those of high school age until the late
1920s.  The increase in college attendance, especially after World War II, for both men and
women, added to the increase in the age at which work began.
Older Americans
The  participation  of  older  Americans  also  underwent  significant  change, although there is
controversy concerning trends prior to the 1930s.  Several researchers (Costa 1993, 1998; Margo
1993a;  Moen  1987a,  1987b;  but  see  Ransom  and  Sutch  1986)  have  used  federal  population
census  data  to  show  that  retirement  increased  almost continuously from about 1880 to the
present  (see  Figure  6).  Although a discontinuity in the labor force participation of older men
appears with the passage of the Social Security Act in 1935, a decline is apparent prior to 1935.
In 1900 about 65 percent of men older than 64 years old reported an occupation.  But by 1980
less than 25 percent were in the labor force under one definition and about 20 percent were using
the census definition.
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Also of importance is that participation rates in 1900 for older men were 10 percentage
points higher in rural than in urban areas.  Thus it may appear that retirement was lower among
farmers and others in rural areas (Long 1958).  But the lower retirement rates for men living in
rural  areas  may  be  misleading.  Many who retired moved out of rural areas and off the farm,
leaving those in rural areas with higher than average labor force participation rates (Costa 1993,
1998).Goldin -19-
For the non-farm population, retirement may have been more gradual in the past than it is
today.  Not all employed older men continued to work in the jobs they had in middle age.
Particularly when jobs required substantial brawn, many retired slowly, on-the-job, by switching
to less intense occupations (Ransom and Sutch 1986).
The fact that the increase in male retirement preceded the passage of the Social Security
Act means that long-run factors must have operated to reduce labor force participation of older
men.  And because the increase in retirement occurred within the urban population, as well as
within the country as a whole, the increase could not have been due solely to a decrease in farm
employment.  In fact, farmers retired at a rate about equal to that of the non-farm population in
1910  (Costa  1993).  The most likely reason for the rise in retirement was an increase in real
income and thus savings for old age (Costa 1993, 1998).
Men in their early to middle years, say from age 25 to 55, participated in the labor force
to a considerable degree, perhaps at the maximum that could be expected in a healthy population
during  most  of  our  history.  The past twenty years, however, has witnessed a decrease in the
employment  rate of men in their prime ages.  Although the decrease is more extreme for the
nonwhite  population,  it  is  apparent  for the white population as well.  From 1970 to 1990 the
participation rate of men 45 to 64 decreased from 89 percent to 80 percent (see Table 1) and that
for men 55 to 64 decreased from 83 percent to 68 percent.
Women in the Labor Force
All the shifts in labor force participation just  enumerated served to decrease the aggregate
labor force participation rate.  Increased education diminished the paid labor of youth; increased
retirement meant a decrease in the paid labor of older men; and more recently the participation
of  prime-aged  males  has  even  decreased  somewhat.  The one major countervailing trend in
twentieth  century  labor  force  has  been  the  increased  participation of women.  Their greaterGoldin -20-
participation across this century served to increase the aggregate labor force participation rate of
25 to 44 year olds by about 50 percent.
15  Not all of the increase in female paid labor, to be sure,
translated directly into an increase in national income.  Some hours of female paid labor came at
the  expense  of  a  decrease  in  home-produced  goods,  like  bread and clothing, that were later
produced  in the market (Goldin 1986).  But even if none of the increase in female workers
augmented  national  income,  the  evolution of the female labor force would still have enormous
social and political significance.  Paid labor outside the home for adult women conferred special
status and led, eventually, to a call for real equality.
In 1900 less than 5 percent of all white married women were paid workers outside their
homes.  A wide gulf existed between the labor force participation of men and women.  But with
each  passing  decade  the  gap  narrowed.  Figure 7 graphs participation rates of all women and
men 25 to 44 years old.  The participation rate of women 25 to 44 years old increased by about
10  percentage  points  every  decade from 1940 to 1990, narrowing the large gulf that existed
earlier in the century.  The same increases occurred in the participation rate of married women,
although their rates increased even more over the entire century.
During the 1920 to 1940 period the greatest increases were for young married women, as
can be seen in Figure 8.  But from 1940 to 1960 the participation rate of white married women
45  to  54  years  old  soared,  rising  from  10  percent  to  about  40  percent.  Other age groups of
married  women  also  experienced  increased  participation  during  those  twenty years, but at a
much slower rate.  The younger group, 25 to 34 years old, for example increased at about a third
the amount of the 45 to 54 year olds.  Many younger married women in the 1946 to 1960 period
were  temporary  stay-at-home moms producing the  Ababy  boom.@  Increases were greatest for
their age group during the 1960s to 1970s.  By 1980 almost every group of women was an active
participant in the labor force.  Women with infants provide the one exception, but in the 1980sGoldin -21-
women  with  young  children  rapidly  increased their participation in the labor force.  By 1990
more than half of all women with children returned to the work force within one year of giving
birth.
The data in Table 1 and Figures 7 and 8 accept the official statistics in the U.S. federal
census of population on occupation.  As noted previously, the labor force concept before 1940
was that of Againful employment.@  In 1900 just 3 percent of all white, married women claimed
to have had an occupation.  Archival research has shown that a far greater percentage worked for
pay or produced for the market sector either in their own homes, on the family farm, or in the
family business.  Still others labored in the market sector but worked intermittently or for a few
hours a week and did not report their occupation to the census taker.  Given the social stigma
that existed against white, married women=s working for pay, it is not surprising that the reported
labor  force  participation  rate  of  married  women  was  extremely  low  when  women=s  work  was
primarily in domestic service and manufacturing.
The historical record on women=s work in the United States is now sufficiently complete
that a participation rate including all paid employment and production for the market can be
constructed.  Rather than a participation rate of about 3 percent for all married, white women the
adjusted  figure  is  around  15  percent  for  c.1895.  The adjustments add in some portion of
boardinghouse  keepers,  unpaid family farm workers, and uncounted female workers in
manufacturing (Goldin 1986).  By 1940 when the procedures used by the census established the
modern  labor  force  construct,  the  participation  rate  of  all  married,  white women was just 12.5
percent.  It is possible, therefore, that the labor force participation of married women in the
United States traced out a c-shape across economic development, similar to that found in many
developing countries (Goldin 1995).Goldin -22-
Because the rise of women=s paid employment was a change of enormous consequence,
the  factors  that  propelled  this  movement  bear  further  discussion.  The expansion of high school
education, particularly for young women, and the growth of the clerical and sales sectors in the
1920s were the first changes that attracted a large group of adult, married white women into the
paid  labor  force.  The increased education of women and the continued growing demand for
female  white-collar  workers  fueled  the  large expansion in participation after World War II.
ARosie  the  Riveter@  returned  home  after  the  war,  but  her  counterparts in office work, teaching,
nursing,  and  other white-collar employments remained in the labor force (Goldin 1991).  Thus
the  increase in the real wages of women workers enticed them to leave the household.
Decreased fertility (for the older cohorts, not the younger ones, in the 1950s and 1960s and for
the  younger cohorts in the post-1960s era) and the greater availability of market substitutes for
home-produced  goods  were  reinforcing  elements.  Not all decades had the same set of factors
operating.  In the pre-1940 period shifts to the supply of female labor account for most of the
increase in participation.  But in the 1940 to 1960 period, shifts in the demand for female labor
accounted  for  almost  all  of  the  change.  More recently supply shifts have increased in relative
importance  and  now  share  equally  with  demand  shifts  for the continued rise in female labor
force  participation.
16  Each of the periods has also witnessed different changes in the relative
wage of female to male labor, a topic considered in the section on inequality.
5. The Rise and Decline of Big Labor: Unionization in the Private and Public Sectors
Until passage of the National Industrial Recovery Act (1933) and later with the Wagner
Act (1935), also known as the National Labor Relations Act, unionized labor in the United States
had an uncertain legal standing.  The N.I.R.A. was a stop-gap measure that gave employees the
right  to  organize  and  bargain collectively in return for permitting business to write their ownGoldin -23-
codes  of  fair  competition.  Although the N.I.R.A. increased union activity, not all industries and
firms  went  along  with  the  principles  of  the  legislation.  Real change in the law came in 1935
with the Wagner Act.  The Wagner Act gave unions the right to organize, set up a procedure for
workers to form a union, and established the rules governing the bargaining relationship between
workers and management.  The Wagner Act replaced the Alaw of the jungle@ with Alabor=s bill of
rights,@ although some of these were altered with the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947.  It
is  no  wonder,  then,  that  the  time  series  in  Figure  9  on  union  members  as  a proportion of all
nonagricultural employees contains a sharp break with 1936 when the ratio doubles.
17  The true
flowering of the union movement in America, however, occurred just at the close of World War
II.  In the subsequent decade unionization nationwide reached about 30 to 35 percent of
nonagricultural  employment.  Private sector unionization, however, began to decline as early as
1960  and  has  tumbled  downward  almost  every  year  since.  Its level today, as can be seen in
Figure 9, is almost identical to that on the eve of the Wagner Act.  Yet its recent decline is
fundamentally related to its evolution in the preceding century.
Unions  in  the  nineteenth  century  were  primarily  craft  organizations, most having
independent identities in their city or town.  With increasing mobility of labor and the creation of
national markets in goods and services in the nineteenth century, the local union was doomed.
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An item produced by nonunionized labor in Schenectady, for example, was a close substitute for
a  similar  one  produced  by  unionized  labor  in  Buffalo.  Further, the unionized machinist in
Cincinnati  might  decide to migrate to Baltimore.  National trade unions were formed in the
nineteenth  century to cope with these problems, and their culmination was the formation of the
American  Federation  of  Labor  (AFL)  in 1886.
19  The industrial union, containing workers
unified by work site rather than trade, had a slower start.  The first such union was the UnitedGoldin -24-
Mine Workers formed in 1890.  The movement culminated in the formation of the Congress of
Industrial Organizations in 1935, which later merged with the AFL in 1955.
Until passage of the Wagner Act, American unions were thwarted by two outside forces
C the law and the militia.  The Sherman Antitrust Act, passed in 1890 ostensibly to decrease the
role of monopoly elements in product markets, was used against unions, most notably against
union boycotts in a Supreme Court decision known as the Danbury Hatters= case (1908).  The
United  Hatters  had  staged  a  boycott  in  1902  against  a  firm  producing  hats  with  nonunionized
labor.  To the Supreme Court such a boycott was in restraint of interstate commerce, and the
hatters, found by the court to be individually liable, were fined a colossal amount.
20  There were
other ways as well that the law was used against labor.  Firms, in many states, required that
workers sign agreements in advance of their hire binding them not to join a union.  Several states
outlawed  these  so-called  Ayellow  dog@  contracts,  but  such  laws  were  deemed unconstitutional,
remaining so until passage of the Norris-La Guardia Act in 1932.
The role of the militia against labor and trade unions can be traced to several strikes and
incidents in the late nineteenth century (Dulles and Dubofsky 1993).  One was the Haymarket
Square  riot  in  Chicago  which  began  as  a  strike  for  the  eight-hour  day  against McCormick
Harvester.  It began peacefully on May 1, 1886 but ended bloodily after police were called to the
scene to assist strikebreakers and a bomb later exploded.  Of more importance to the history of
organized labor was the strike in 1892 against the Carnegie Steel Company at its Homestead, PA
plant.  Homestead involved the direct confrontation between one of the nation=s  strongest  labor
unions  and  one  of the nation=s  largest  firms.  It ended only when the governor of Pennsylvania
ordered the state militia to place Homestead under martial law.
The  strike  of  workers  at  the  Pullman  Palace Car Company began in 1894 and spread
nationwide, through a secondary boycott to railroads using Pullman cars.  Railway workersGoldin -25-
showed allegiance by supporting those at Pullman and the union movement appeared, for a brief
moment, to have strength and leadership.  The strike was quashed by President Cleveland=s use
of federal troops to move the mails and finally by injunction.
The reaction of the American government to labor organization and labor unrest has been
contrasted with that of the French.  Such study highlights how American law and the militia
were  able  to  crush  the  union  movement,  whereas the French military encouraged and furthered
labor=s  right  to  unionize  and  strike.  AAmerican  exceptionalism,@  by  which  is  meant  the  absence
in  the  United  States of a labor or social democratic party, has been traced to these factors
(Friedman  1988).  But its foundations must be sought in more basic, fundamental, and very
American  features.  Cheap and available land served to reduce social unrest and mitigated
downward  pressure  on  wages  in  industrial  and  urban  areas.  Abundant immigration provided an
ever-available source of cheap, unskilled labor in the post-1890s era.  Both factors, at different
points in American history, reduced the demand for a national labor party and served to divide
labor.
Under the union banner are both public and private sector unions.  Public sector unions
rose after the 1960s but have leveled off in membership since the 1980s.  Private sector unions
declined  precipitously  since the early 1970s.  Because public sector unions actually rose slightly
or  remained  constant  during  the  post-1960s  period,  the  decline  in  private  sector unionization is
even  more  extreme  than  the  total  union  membership  fraction graphed in Figure 9.  Placed in a
long-run  context, as it is in Figure 9, the post-Wagner Act boom in union membership is the
anomaly, not the recent decline in private-sector unionization.
One  possible  cause  for  the  recent  demise  of  private-sector  unions  extends  the  argument,
given  earlier,  concerning  why  national  unions  arose  in  the  nineteenth  century.  With increasing
internationalization of product markets, America has had to compete globally, just as firms in theGoldin -26-
United  States  had  to  compete  nationally in the nineteenth century.  To remain viable, local
unions in the nineteenth century joined forces to create a national union.  Possibly because there
is no international union, the union movement in America and in other parts of the industrialized
world, such as Great Britain, has been weakened.
The primary goal of unions in the twentieth century has been to better the rewards of
labor:  to  increase  the  wage  per  unit  time, to expand employer-provided benefits, to improve
working  conditions,  and,  often,  to  reduce  scheduled  hours  of  work.  Most evaluations of the
impact  of  unions  have  attempted  to  estimate the wage premium received by union members.
Such estimates have ranged widely, but the general conclusion has been that, at the peak of its
membership, unions in most industries increased wages by only 5 percent above those of non-
union  workers.
21  In some sectors, however, such as mining and the building trades, the union
wage  effect  may  have  been  as  high  as  20  percent.  The wage effect was larger overall in the
1920s when unions were a smaller percentage of total nonagricultural employment and it rose to
the early 1930s (Lewis 1963, 1986).
Thus  although the union movement was a critical factor in some industries, most of the
gains labor achieved in the twentieth century occurred because of market forces, not because of
the power of organized labor.  I do not mean to claim that labor unions have not served a useful
role in the American labor market or that they have not been a pivotal force in the economies of
many European countries.  The question for American economic historians is whether a private-
sector union membership of 10 to 15 percent, or approximately its level in the early 1900s and
today, rather than one of 35 percent, that achieved at its peak, would have altered the rewards
labor has garnered in the twentieth century.  The counterfactual is a difficult one, but I doubt it
would  have  made  much  of  a  difference  overall.  I offer an amendment in the section on the
distribution  of  labor=s  rewards.  The wide wage structure in the United States makes it uniqueGoldin -27-
among  industrialized  countries.  Those countries with strong nation-wide unions have far more
compressed wage structures and far more extensive social insurance.
Neither  the  rate of productivity growth nor the rate of decrease in hours was much
affected  by  the  degree  of  labor  organization.  Labor productivity and real wages did rise at a
faster clip after World War II than before the Great Depression (see Figures 1 and 2), but there is
no  evidence  that  increased unionization was the cause.  Further, labor productivity continued to
increase  after  1960  when  unionization  was  on  the  decline.  Hours decreases, furthermore, were
almost all gained prior to the rise of big labor, even though shorter hours were organized labor=s
most constant demand in the nineteenth century.
To claim that organized labor has not been a potent force in our labor history does not
mean  that  it  could  not  have  been.  For supporting evidence we need only look at the many
European countries, as well as Australia, New Zealand, and Israel, in which the labor movement
is  robust  and  powerful.  There are nine countries in Europe for which union membership as a
percentage of employment in 1991 exceeded that reached in the peak year in the United States,
and  there are several others in which union membership is low but in which union agreements
cover  a  significant fraction of non-unionized labor (for example, France).  All these countries
have  pension,  sickness,  and  unemployment coverage, to mention but three aspects of the
Awelfare state,@ that far exceeds that in the United States (Freeman and Rogers 1992).  The wage
structure  in  these  countries  is  also  considerably  more  compressed  than  in  the  United  States.
Thus the correct counterfactual would be to ask what organized labor would have accomplished
had it been a stronger political force and represented more than half of the employed, not what
gains unionized labor has made in the United States from its trough to its peak.
6. The Evolution of Modern Labor MarketsGoldin -28-
Spot and Contractual Labor Markets
The  labor  market  of  an  industrialized  and developed nation, it is often thought, evolved
from  a  spot  market,  eventually  becoming characterized by longer-term commitments, of an
explicit  or  implicit  nature.  The modern market of longer-term contracts, it is believed, arose in
the  United  States  sometime  in  the  1940s  and  1950s  and  replaced  a  rather  chaotic  market  in
which workers often migrated among jobs across the seasons, the business cycle, and in general.
The modern labor market, in contrast, is supposedly inhabited by workers with property rights in
their jobs.
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Put  starkly,  the  argument  is  that  the  labor market in the nineteenth century was a spot
market  in  which  workers  had  considerable  job  insecurity,  invested  little  in  human capital, had
trivial  wage  growth  over their life cycles, were discarded as older workers, were subjected to
considerable  discretion  by  foremen  and  supervisors,  and  were  disciplined by  Asticks,@  such  as
being fired or fined.  In contrast, the labor market of the post-World War II era is characterized
by  greater  job  security,  investment  in  human  capital,  internal  labor  markets,  wage  growth  (but
possibly  not  productivity  growth)  over  the  life  cycle, firm-related benefits, protection for older
workers, strict personnel rules, and discipline by Acarrots@ and other incentives.
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By a spot market I mean one in which labor=s wage is approximately equal to its marginal
product,  in  which  there  is  little,  if  any,  human  capital that is specific to the firm, and in which
hiring  costs  are  inconsequential.  Virtually no labor market is  Aspot@  in  the  sense  of  being  an
auction market every day, the way the market for day labor in agriculture is thought to be.  And
even  day  labor  in  agriculture  was  often  characterized  by  longer-term  arrangements  in  the
nineteenth century.  Although it is difficult to pinpoint precisely what is meant by a spot market,
it is easy to say what it is not.  The payment of benefits and pensions, the creation of a wage
structure  that  is  upward  sloping  with  tenure  when  marginal  product  is not, the existence ofGoldin -29-
internal  labor  markets,  among  others features, are clearly not those of a spot labor market.
Rather, they are institutions associated with longer-term commitments between firms and
workers.
Economic  historians,  labor  economists, and labor historians have compiled considerable
evidence about the transition from spot markets to more modern labor market institutions, but
our  knowledge  about  the  characteristics  just  mentioned  is  still  vastly  incomplete.  It seems clear
that  various  aspects  of  the  labor  market  changed  considerably  over  the  last  hundred years.
Employer-provided  benefits,  for  example,  now  comprise  a  large  fraction of workers=
compensation packages C 17 percent according to Figure 4 C but were virtually absent before
1930.  Rules, rather than supervisor discretion, now govern personnel decisions in most firms,
although  personnel  departments  were  virtually  unknown  before  1910.  Unions, as was just
shown, became a powerful force in the labor market after the mid-1930s, although they have
declined  in  the  private  sector  since  the  late  1950s.  But other seemingly related indicators may
not  have  moved  in  the  direction  predicted  by  the  somewhat  simplistic  depiction  of  the  evolution
of modern labor markets just offered.
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What Caused the Evolution of Modern Labor Market Institutions
To  make  sense  of  the  process by which the labor market has evolved, it is useful to
consider  the  reasons  why  change  occurred.  There are several schools of thought on the issue.
First is that changes in technology increased the returns to firm-specific human capital and made
managers eager to retain trained workers.  Related to the argument is that the increased size of
firms  (see  Table  6)  and  their  weightier  bureaucracies led owners to seek ways to reduce the
opportunistic  behavior  of  foremen  and  supervisors  (Edwards 1979).  Rules, rather than
discretion,  were  instituted,  and  personnel  offices  were  instituted  to  enact and execute company,Goldin -30-
rather  than  divisional,  decisions.  Institutions of this type circumvented the principal-agent
problem inherent in the previous system.
An alternative thesis for the evolution of modern labor markets is that workers, at some
point, gained considerable power and formed or threatened to form unions (Jacoby 1984, 1985).
Firms,  in  turn,  gave  workers  certain  benefits  as  a  defensive  strategy.  In the process, workers
gained some of the rents that capitalists had previously reaped.  Thus Henry Ford, according to
this line of reasoning, gave his workers above-market wages in the form of the five-dollar day to
deter unions.
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Entire industries, today and in the past, pay workers higher than market wages across the
board.  One way to explain what is known as the Ainterindustry wage differential@ is to appeal to
rent-seeking on the part of workers.  Alternatively, or in conjunction with this thesis, is that
unions,  or  the  threat  of  organizing,  have  served  to  bring  about the transition to modern labor
market  institutions.  A common factor in the argument why workers eventually gained power is
that the close of immigration during and after World War I tightened the labor market.
The  evidence  on  the  interindustry  wage  differential  is  suggestive but inconclusive for the
past.  Stronger evidence can be marshaled for the more recent period.  Controlling for various
individual  characteristics,  certain industries have paid higher wages to workers across the skill
spectrum.  Further, those industries that paid higher wages have tended to remain the same
across several decades (Krueger and Summers 1987).  The evidence suggests that rents are
shared by workers and capital and that there is persistence in these rents.  But longer-run data are
less revealing.
Stability  in  the  wages  of  unskilled  male  workers  by  industry  has  been  found  for  the
period from the 1920s to the 1940s (Slichter 1950) and for that from the 1920s to the 1980s
(Krueger  and  Summers  1987).  Stability has also been found across industries for the annualGoldin -31-
earnings of manufacturing workers in the 1899 to 1950 period (Cullen 1956).  Yet, because even
unskilled  workers  can  be  heterogeneous  with  regard  to  productivity,  the  implication of these
findings for an interindustry wage differential and for the existence of efficiency wages can be
questioned.
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The  Jungle  (1906),  Upton Sinclair=s  journalistic  novel,  exposed  the  unsafe  work
conditions  and  uncertain  employment  of  unskilled  labor  in  the  early  twentieth  century.  New
hires  in  the  meatpacking  industry,  for  example,  were  chosen  from  among  the long lines of men
that  formed  outside  the  factory  gates.  But what determined why one worker was chosen over
another, and why were factory wages apparently above market clearing given the throngs
outside?  Such situations have been interpreted as a disciplinary device and the wage has been
termed an Aefficiency wage.@  Workers know that if they are fired their only alternative would be
a less remunerative position or unemployment.  They therefore work harder and shirk less.  But
the  chosen  workers,  Sinclair  tells  us,  differed  from  the  men  who  were  left  outside.  They were
more  recent  arrivals,  in  better  physical  (and  mental)  condition  than  those who had already
worked in the meat-packing factories and were fired, laid off, or had taken ill.  Unskilled labor
was heterogeneous physically and in terms of motivation, thus differences in pay may not reveal
the workings of an Aefficiency wage.@
If  the  interindustry  wage  differential  is  a  function  of  industry  rents,  the  competitiveness
of  industries  should  correlate  well  with  wages.  Of importance to historical study is that an
interindustry wage differential should have emerged around 1900, during the period of the rise of
big business and the great merger movement.  There is no evidence to date on this matter.Goldin -32-
7. Downtime: Unemployment, Layoffs, Sickness, and Seasonality
Long-term Unemployment Trends
Annual unemployment statistics have been collected as part of the Current Population
Survey  ever  since  1940,  and  estimates  of  unemployment  exist  for  earlier  years  that  use  the
decennial censuses since 1890 for benchmarks.  The original series for 1890 to 1899 is due to
Stanley  Lebergott;  that  for  1900  to  1930  is  also due to Lebergott but builds on different
underlying  data.  The BLS unemployment data are generally used for the 1930s.  Several
competing time series now exist for much of the pre-1940 period.
The Lebergott pre-1930 series compared with the  Current Population Survey data for the
post-1940 period reveal that unemployment in the non-farm sector was lower after World War II
than  before  the  Great  Depression.  The comparison also showed that the annual volatility of
unemployment decreased with time.  On both counts the U.S. labor force would have much to be
thankful for.  But a revised series, due to Christina Romer, has altered the findings for both
volatility  and  level.  The Lebergott and Romer series are given in Figure 10 for the total labor
force.  Differences between the two series have not yet been fully resolved.
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The Romer revisions were made to correct for the possible introduction of excessive
volatility in the original Lebergott numbers.  If the Romer revisions are correct, the volatility of
unemployment  after  World  War  II  falls  by  only a small amount in comparison with its level
prior to the Great Depression.  In the original Lebergott series, volatility fell by a substantial
amount over the twentieth century.  Note in Figure 10 that the Romer series, from 1890 to 1929,
always has lower peaks and higher troughs than does the Lebergott series.
The differences in the two series stem from how the annual data were produced from the
various  benchmark  estimates  for  unemployment  in  the  pre-1930  data.  According to Romer,
increased  volatility  crept  into  the  pre-Depression  Lebergott  data  through  several  routes.
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Unemployment  in  both  series  is  derived  as  the  difference between the labor force and
employment,  and  the  annual  estimates  for  the  labor  force  and  employment  are  produced  by
extrapolating on the basis of other variables.  The labor force in the Lebergott estimates was
extrapolated  on  population.  But in cyclical upturns the labor force expands and in cyclical
downturns it contracts.  Employment was extrapolated on the basis of output.  But employment
contracts less in downturns than does output and expands less in upturns than does output.  In
other words, labor is Ahoarded@ over the cycle and is less volatile than is output.  Each of these
effects would add volatility to the estimated unemployment series.
Because the Romer series has less volatility than does that due to Lebergott, it also has
lower  peaks.  The revisions to the unemployment figures for the 1890s are substantial.  Rather
than rising to a peak of 18.4 percent in 1894, the revised data reach a peak of 12.3 percent.
Similarly,  unemployment  in  the  recession  following  World  War  I  is  far lower using the revised
figures.  Rather than reaching 11.7 percent nationwide, the figure is 8.7 percent.
Both  the  Lebergott  and  the  Romer  series  refer  to  the  entire labor force.  But
unemployment among farmers (although not among farm laborers) was a fraction of the level in
the economy without farmers, and farmers were 20 percent of the entire labor force in 1900.  The
adjusted estimate of unemployment in the non-farmer sector in 1894 would have been about 23
percent  using  the  Lebergott  data,  or  about  as high as it was at its peak during the Great
Depression.  If the Romer series is used the 1890s figure is 15 percent in the non-farmer sector,
still an impressively high figure.
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The  discrepancies  between  the  Romer and Lebergott estimates involve only the pre-
1930s  estimates.  The debate has not concerned the issue of unemployment during the Great
Depression.  A separate controversy has raged over the level of unemployment in the 1930s and
concerns the treatment of individuals on federal relief programs.Goldin -34-
For  the  twentieth  century  the  issue  of  unemployment  is  synonymous  with  the  Great
Depression.
30  The BLS-Lebergott data indicate unemployment in 1933, during the depths of the
Great Depression, was 25 percent of the total labor force.  But estimates of unemployment for
the 1930s hinge critically on whether a large group of workers supported by federal work relief
programs are included in the unemployed population, as they generally are in the official BLS
data.  A revised set of estimates gives a somewhat different picture of unemployment during the
Great Depression.
31  Estimates excluding relief workers contain a peak unemployment rate of 23
percent in 1932 and one of 21  percent in 1933 (Darby 1976).  Unemployment declined to 14.6
percent by 1940, according to official statistics, but to 9.5 percent if relief workers are excluded.
Unemployment Duration and Incidence: 1900 and 1980
Although  the  volatility  of  unemployment  may  not  have  changed  across  the twentieth
century, many other aspects of unemployment, gleaned at the micro rather than the macro level,
did  change.  The duration and incidence of unemployment spells was altered considerably from
the late-nineteenth century to the present.  Spell duration was briefer around 1900 than in the late
1970s,  although  the  incidence  of  unemployment  was  higher.  The difference in incidence results
mainly from a change in the occupational distribution.  Relatively more white-collar workers are
in the labor force today than in 1900, and their unemployment incidence is low.  The finding that
incidence  decreased  over  time  is  consistent  with  evidence  showing  that  seasonality  in  the
manufacturing,  construction,  and  transportation  sectors,  among  others,  caused considerable
unemployment around 1900 (see Goldin and Engerman 1993).  But the difference in duration is
not  so  easily  explained  by  compositional factors.  The longer duration of unemployment today
may  be  due  to  the  greater  ability  firms  now  have  to  tag  certain  individuals whose employment
prospects get bleaker with every spell of unemployment.  Alternatively or in conjunction, theGoldin -35-
provision  of  unemployment  insurance may encourage firms to lay off workers selectively and to
recall them just before their benefits run out.
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Data from various state surveys around the turn of this century and from the U.S. federal
population  census  manuscripts  for  1910  allow  a  detailed  examination  of the duration and
incidence of unemployment that can be compared with data for the more recent period.  Table 8
tabulates annual days lost for reason of  Ano work@ among men less than 65 years old who were
not self-employed and were working in the manufacturing sector (some samples contain workers
in  transportation  and  construction).  Four state BLS surveys are used here -- those from
California (1892), Kansas (1884 to 1887), Maine (1890), and Michigan (1889).  Estimates are
also  given  in  Table  8  for the number of days unemployed conditional on experiencing some
unemployment  and  the  total  number  of  days  in the work year, given by the implicit number of
days worked plus the number lost to all causes.
The  percentage  of  manufacturing  workers  who  experienced  some  unemployment during
the year was extremely high in three of the states.  In Kansas and Michigan more than 60 percent
of  all  manufacturing workers reported being unemployed during some period of the year.  In
Maine about 50 percent did, although only 32 percent reported so in California, about the same
rate  as  in  the  1910  federal  population  census  for  similar  workers.  The modal amount of time,
conditional  on  experiencing  some  unemployment during the year, was about 2 to 3 months of
Aworking time,@ where a month of working time is taken to be 26 days.
Although the data for Kansas, Maine, and Michigan are comparable, they are far higher
than are those for California and for the manufacturing sector in the United States in 1910.  The
differences  do  not  appear  due  to  industrial  and  occupational  coverage  in  the  state  data,  nor  do
they appear to be influenced by the particular dates of the surveys.  Rather, they seem to reflect
either  highly  variable  unemployment  by  year  and  place,  or  a  more  accurate  assessment  ofGoldin -36-
unemployment  in  certain  state  surveys  as opposed to the federal population census.  At the
current time, we do not know why these differences arise across these samples.
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The  data  in  tandem do suggest that workers in the past faced a much higher average
probability  of  becoming  unemployed  than  they  do  today  but that they were reemployed faster.
Kansas laborers, for example, faced a 6.5 percent probability of becoming unemployed in any
given  month.  Cumulated over the year, the annual probability of entering unemployment was
slightly greater than 50 percent.  For a Kansas laborer, the mean waiting time between spells of
unemployment  was  15.4  months.  Within 3.7 years, fully 95 percent of all currently employed
Kansas  laborers  would  have  experienced  unemployment.  Virtually every one would have been
laid off or terminated (or quit) at some point over a four year period.  In contrast, an employed
worker facing the 1977/79 entry hazard had a mean waiting time of approximately 9 years, and it
would have taken 26 years for 95 percent of them to experience at least one unemployment spell
(see Goldin and Margo 1991).
Although the probability of becoming unemployed was higher in the past than it is today,
the  probability  of  reemployment  was  also  higher.  An unemployed worker in the Maine survey,
for  example,  faced  a  34.4 percent probability of being reemployed within one month.
Consequently the estimated mean length of an unemployment spell was very brief  C  just  2.8
months or about 70 days, far less than the mean spell in 1977/79 of just under half a year.
The  correlates  of  unemployment  also  changed  over  the  past  century.  Although certain
observable  individual  characteristics  were  associated  with  unemployment  spells  in  the  late
nineteenth  century,  industry  and  occupation  overwhelmingly  determined  the  incidence  of
unemployment  over  the year as well as the duration of unemployment conditional on
experiencing  any.  The individual characteristics that mattered were those associated with
geographic  stability  and,  possibly,  perceived  need.  For example, married men encounteredGoldin -37-
unemployment less often than did others, and having a larger family was associated with a lower
probability  of  being  unemployed.  These findings raise the possibility that foremen, prior to the
establishment  of  personnel departments, exercised power in deciding whom to lay off and may
have  set  rules  of  fairness  governing  these decisions.  Alternatively, married men and those with
larger families may have been more willing to bribe supervisors directly or indirectly in terms of
harder work.
Layoffs, Recalls, and Industrial Suspensions
It is clear that the vast majority of manufacturing workers in most of the states surveyed
lost time during the year because they were laid off or were terminated.  Layoff rates, in most of
the surveys, appear considerably higher than in recent data and one might wonder if many of the
workers were recalled by their employer.  We know that today the vast majority of layoffs, for
which the worker received unemployment insurance (UI), end in recall.
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The only means of assessing recall in the state BLS data is to observe the unemployment
experiences of workers with a year or more of tenure with the same firm and compare them with
similar workers who had less than one-year tenure with their current firm.  Workers employed
by the same firm for at least a year, yet who claimed that they experienced unemployment during
the  past  year,  must  have  been  laid  off  and  subsequently  recalled.  But, among the group with
more  than  one  year  of  job  experience,  those  who suffered unemployment during the year yet
who were not working for their firm for one year, must not have been recalled.
Recall ranged from 71 percent to 91 percent, with a mean of about 80 percent, for the
group  experiencing  some  unemployment.  Thus, of all employees who were laid off fully 80
percent  were  eventually  recalled  and  rehired.  These figures are not much different from those
among workers today covered by UI whose spells ended either in recall or employment at
another  firm.
35  Recalled workers, in the late-nineteenth century, experienced 14 days lessGoldin -38-
unemployment  than  did  those  not  recalled, holding constant various factors.  Because the mean
length of unemployment over the year was 56 days in the group being considered, those recalled
lost 25 percent less time due to Ano work@ than those not recalled.
The  finding  of  extensive  recall  among  late-nineteenth  century workers comes as a
surprise.  Many economic historians have commented on the high rates of unemployment
experienced  by  particular  subgroups  in  the  population and at particular times in the late
nineteenth century, such as during the depression of the 1890s.  Extensive unemployment due to
seasonality was viewed as costly, not just in terms of consumption smoothing, but more often in
terms  of  compelling  labor  to  be  excessively  and  wastefully  mobile.  It was this excessive
mobility that led many to view the pre-World War II labor market as chaotic and to applaud the
new labor market institutions of the post-World War II era.  If the recall numbers implicit in the
state  BLS  data  withstand  further  scrutiny, they suggest an entirely different interpretation.  For
the vast majority of workers and during most periods of time, the regularity inherent in seasonal
layoffs may have kept labor around, to be hired by exactly the same firms when business picked
up or when inputs became available again.  Thus the role of UI in ensuring a steady flow of labor
services by keeping labor fed and parked at the factory gates may be considerably less than we
think.
Sickness and Vacation Time
Survey  data  from  the  turn  of  the century indicate how workers handled sickness and
vacation  leave-time  prior  to  the  institution  of  firm-provided  benefits that often covered both.
Somewhere between 20 and 33 percent of workers took some sick leave over the year and the
time  lost  due  to  illness, among those with sick leave, was between 22 and 28 days.  Thus
anywhere  from  four  to  five  working  weeks were lost to sickness for individuals who claimed
sick  leave  during  the  year,  although  the  time  could  have  been  taken  in  single  or  multiple  spells.Goldin -39-
There are no comparable estimates for the current period because many workers receive personal
days that can be taken as sick leave.  Other information, however, affords comparisons.
In the 1970s about 3.5 percent of all workers did not report to their jobs on any day,
excluding  that  due  to  paid  vacations.  The mean for white-collar workers was 2.8 percent and
that  for  blue-collar workers was 6.3 percent.  Among late-nineteenth century blue-collar
workers, the figure was 3.6 percent for California, 5.5 percent for Kansas, and 5.9 percent for
Maine.  By necessity, these figures include time lost due to (unpaid) vacations (although that
appears to have been quite small).  Thus total time off as a fraction of the total work year was
lower  in  the  late  nineteenth  century  than  today,  consistent  with  the  notion that workers
intertemporally substituted downtime across the year and that time off due to sickness increased
when workers were compensated for days lost.
36  It should be emphasized that the findings do
not  imply  that  workers  were  more  healthy  in  1900.  Their productivity was probably
substantially reduced from having to go to work in poor health.
Economic historians have long wondered how nineteenth century manufacturing workers
coped  with  eleven  or  twelve  hour days, six days a week.  The extremely high incidence of
unemployment  among  manufacturing  workers  raises  the  question  of  intertemporal  substitution.
In most of the samples the elasticity of days lost due to other causes (i.e., other than sickness)
with respect to that due to Ano work@ was large.  For California workers in manufacturing who
experienced some days lost to Ano work,@ for example, the elasticity was -0.5.  That is, among
workers  experiencing  unemployment  in  the  previous  year,  a  10  percent  increase  in  days lost to
Ano work@ was accompanied by a 5 percent reduction in days lost due to more voluntary factors,
other than sickness.
37  Thus, in general, workers smoothed their downtime over the year and, not
surprisingly, intertemporally substituted unemployment time for voluntary downtime.Goldin -40-
Seasonality in the Past and Present
The  high  incidence  yet  relatively  short  duration of unemployment in 1900, in comparison
with  more recent data, reinforces the notion that seasonality had stronger employment effects in
the distant past than today.  The ratio of peak to trough monthly employment for manufacturing
workers by industry was high in 1900.  Further, the trough months vary more across industry
today than in the past.  Most workers who were laid off during 1900 must have experienced their
unemployment in July/August and December/January, whereas there is far less synchronicity
today.  It should be noted, however, that seasonality in agriculturally-based industries (e.g.,
tobacco)  is  still  strong  today  and  that  troughs  in  employment  are  still  apparent  during  the
summer months just prior to the harvest.  Seasonality was progressively circumvented through
various  market  forces, such as greater diversification in growing areas around the globe, lower
transportation costs, and technological advances that cheapened storage.  It may also be the case
that firms in the past cared less about seasonally laying off workers, but that many firms now





The expansion in the wage structure during the past fifteen to twenty years has attracted
considerable attention.  It began in the late 1970s, increased during the economic boom of 1982
to  1990, and continued in the subsequent economic recession.  Various segments of the labor
force  have  been  left  behind, and their loss in relative economic position has raised questions
about the quality of high schools, the ability of American enterprise to absorb less-skilled labor,
and  the  roles  of  international trade and immigration policy.  Economists have explained the
expansion  in  the  wage  structure  by  appealing to changes in technology, shifts in international
comparative  advantage,  changes  in  the  quality  of  educated  workers,  and  the  decline in private-
sector  unions.  Above all, most of the literature has viewed the widening wage structure as
something anomalous for the United States and in comparison with most other countries.
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Yet  the  wage  structure  underwent  an  even more rapid change in the opposite direction
some  fifty  years  ago  in  the  1940s.  I call this period the Great Compression, because in one
decade the wage structure moved from one of vast inequality to one that displayed more equality
than has been witnessed since.  Income inequality, moreover, must have been affected to an even
greater extent since the unemployment rate in 1939 was still high and was far greater than it was
in 1949, (the years to which the 1940 and 1950 income data from the federal population census
refer).
A  convenient  and  much-used  summary statistic of the wage structure  C  the  ratio  of  the
weekly wage at the 90th percentile to that at the 10th percentile -- is graphed in Figure 11 for
1940 to 1985.  The figure clearly shows that the widening of the wage structure since 1970 has
returned it, at least by the standards of the measure used, to that existing in 1940.  In terms of the
summary statistic in Figure 11, the wage structure in 1940 was as unequal as that in 1985, bothGoldin -42-
having a 90-10 ratio of 4.3.  But in 1950 the same statistic registered a value of only 2.9.  The
wage structure widened a bit during the 1950s, but even as late as 1960 only 21 percent of the
compression of the 1940s had been lost and the 1960s witnessed almost no change at all.
40  Other
measures of the wage structure that rely on less extreme portions of the distribution (such as the
ratio of the wage at the 75th percentile to that at the 25th), reveal similar trends across the past
fifty years.
The compression of the wage structure in the 1940s was general and widespread.  The
narrowing,  for  white  males,  is  evident  by  education, potential labor market experience,
occupation,  and  region.  The premium to college graduation over high school graduation, for
example, declined by about 35 percentage points, and had been, in 1940, about 70 percent, for
men  less  than  45  years  old.  Further, a narrowing can also be discerned within each of the
educational,  experience,  occupational,  and  regional  groupings.  The narrowing did not just occur
between  the  various  groups  but  also  within  them.  The estimation of earnings functions
demonstrate the same findings.  Not only was there a decrease in the Aprice@ of skills from 1940
to 1950, the distribution of residuals was also narrowed considerably.  It is clear that the 1940s
were a decade of extraordinary change in the wage structure.  Further, the wage structure put in
place  in  the  1940s  remained  virtually  intact  during  the  1950s  and  1960s,  quite  unlike  the
experience directly following World War I.
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But the exceptional narrowing of the wage structure during the 1940s may have occurred
because  the  wage  structure  was  anomalous in 1939.  Because unemployment during the 1930s
was  disproportionately  experienced  by  the  lesser  skilled  and  lower  educated,  the  wage  structure
in 1939 could have been substantially widened in comparison to what came before the
depression.  Further, the narrowing of the wage structure during the 1940s may have been part of
a general secular trend toward greater equality in earnings that began long before 1940.
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Both  of  these  possibilities have been explored using two new data sets that yield
information on salaried white-collar workers from the early 1920s to the mid-1950s.  The results
from  the  two  series are reinforcing.  After 1930, the white-collar premium in hourly earnings
increased  (far  more  so  for  weekly  earnings),  reaching  a  peak  sometime around 1933/34 (see
Figure 12).
43  A substantial and rapid narrowing then ensued (possibly due to the impact of the
National  Industrial  Relations Act or to economic recovery), such that the skill differential by
1939 was similar to that in the late 1920s. One clear conclusion from these new data series on
skill differentials is that 1939 was not anomalous (at least not with respect to the hourly wage
ratios for higher to lower educated workers).
Almost all previous evidence on the wage structure for the period prior to 1940 has relied
on  data  for  skilled  operatives, in manufacturing or the building trades, and unskilled workers
(e.g.,  laborers,  janitors).  Numerous studies have found a decrease in the skill differential
measured in this manner from 1900 to 1960, but with the bulk of decrease occurring during the
1940s.  One problem with the literature is that the skill differential being measured has little to
do with education because skilled workers are craft workers, not white-collar employees, and it
is the increase in the supply of educated Americans that is the focus of attention of most work on
the  wage  structure in the latter part of the twentieth century.  The skill differential used in the
previous  literature,  however,  may  be  relevant  for  understanding the impact of changes in
immigration, particularly its restriction in the early 1920s.
44  As noted previously, a recent study,
which builds on the data underlying Figure 12, concludes that there was a substantial narrowing
between  the  wages  of  ordinary  white-collar  workers  and  production workers in manufacturing
sometime around World War I.
Because the wage data for 1939 do not appear anomalous, an explanation for the rapid
and extreme narrowing of the wage structure in the 1940s must rely on the extraordinary changesGoldin -44-
in the economy during the World War II era.  The increased demand for less-skilled labor during
the war must certainly have narrowed the wage structure, and the command economy that
accompanied shifts in demand must have been reinforcing.  Wages, after the Stabilization Act of
1942, were determined by the National War Labor Board (NWLB), and during its brief lifetime,
the  NWLB  processed  almost  a  half-million  applications  for  wage  increases.  Its minuscule staff
often  relied  on  Arules  of  thumb@ by which increases were automatically approved for very low-
wage jobs, to bring workers in a particular occupation up to par with others in the same
occupation,  and  so  on.  All these rules could be expected to reduce inequality between and
within occupations.
Industry  evidence,  compiled  from  a  large  number of Department of Labor studies,
indicates that while the compression did occur to a large extent during the war and affected the
50-10 decile measure to a great degree, there was also considerable compression after the war
and the 90-50 portion of the distribution was equally affected.
45  Thus, the war itself and the
actions  of  the NWLB cannot be given all the credit for decreasing inequality in wages.
Something else must have been going on.
These  other  factors  include  an  increase in the demand for less skilled workers.  If the
1980s created the rust belt, then surely the 1940s and 1950s established (or at least reinforced)
the steel belt.  An increase in the supply of educated workers before and following World War II,
as will be detailed in the section on education below, was a supporting factor in the decrease in
the return to schooling.  But there must also have been other influences.  The increased strength
of  unions  beginning in the late 1940s is clearly a neglected factor, and, if the experience of
European  countries  is  any  guide,  the role of unions in the wage structure may have been
important.  There is also the minimum wage, first put in place in 1938 with the Fair LaborGoldin -45-
Standards Act.  The minimum wage was binding on a large percentage of workers from 1938 to
the 1950s in many industries in the South, for example.
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Black-White Differences in Earnings
The 1940s was also a decade of narrowing incomes between blacks and whites, as can be
seen in Table 9.  The ratio of black to white earnings in 1939 was 0.434 but was 0.552 in 1949.
Part  of  the  narrowing  owes  to  the  migration  of  blacks  from  the  low-wage  South  to  the  higher-
wage  North.  But another part was due to the general compression in the wage structure that
lifted  most  workers in the lower tail of the wage distribution (Margo 1995).  The earnings of
blacks  and  whites  continued  to  converge  after  the  1940s,  a  trend that has been broken only
recently (O=Neill 1990).
The  main long-run factor in the convergence of black and white earnings was the
increase in the years, as well as in the relative quality, of education for blacks (Card and Krueger
1992).  At the turn of this century, when the vast majority of blacks lived in the South, their
years  of  education  and  expenditures  per  pupil  were  exceedingly  low.  Whatever educational
advances followed Emancipation were slowed by the effective disenfranchisement of blacks in
the  post-1890  period  (Margo  1990b).  In 1940 black males 26 to 35 years old had only 60
percent the years of schooling that whites had.  In 1950 they had 71 percent, and by 1980 they
had 90 percent (Smith and Welch 1989, table 9).
The  economic  gains  that  blacks  made  relative  to  whites  since  1940  were  largest  in two
eras.  The first was the decade of the 1940s, and the second was the period from about 1965 to
1975.  All cohorts in Table 9 experienced an increase in the ratio of black to white earnings
during  the  1940s,  whereas  little  occurred  from  1950  to  1960.  Because Table 9 is arrayed by
census years, the change from 1965 to 1975 cannot be easily detected.  But an increase sometime
during  1960  to  1980  is  apparent.  The disjunction in the economic progress of African-Goldin -46-
Americans  suggests  that  episodic factors were also of importance in narrowing the earnings gap
between whites and blacks (Donohue and Heckman 1991).
The  general wage compression of the 1940s and the enormous migration of blacks to the
North have already been mentioned as possible factors in that decade.  The sharp reduction in the
earnings  gap  between  whites  and  blacks  in  the  immediate  post-1965  period  occurred  within  the
South  as  well  as  the  North,  and  was,  therefore,  not  a  function  of  migration.  Several careful
studies  have  demonstrated  that  the  Civil  Rights  Act  of  1964  was  instrumental  in  forcing or
enabling firms to hire black workers in the South, particularly in textiles (Heckman and Paynor
1991).
Although  black  Americans  still  earn  substantially  less  than  do  white  Americans, the gap
between  their  incomes  narrowed  considerably  in  the  decades  since  1940.  By the mid-1970s a
college-educated  black  man  could  expect  to  earn  precisely  what  a  college-educated white man
could.  Since then, however, some of the previous gains have been halted and many have been
reversed.  Among college educated men, for example, the ratio of black earnings to white
earnings decreased by 13 percent from 1973 to 1989.  Similar losses were experienced by those
nationwide with less than a college education.  But far greater reductions were felt by those with
no years of college in the midwest.  That ratio was reduced by 22 percent from 1973 to 1989
(Bound and  Freeman 1992).  We are still too close to the current period to understand why the
gains of the past have been unraveling for African-Americans.
The Gender Gap in Wages
Wage gaps along several dimensions  C  between  the  skilled  and  the  unskilled,  the  more
educated and the less educated, and whites and blacks C widened during the 1980s.  But wage
differences  between  men  and  women  have  narrowed after being relatively constant from about
1955 to 1980.  Another narrowing of the gap between male and female earnings occurred duringGoldin -47-
the first several decades of this century, as can be seen in Figure 13.  In 1900 the ratio of the
wage of a full-time female worker to that of a full-time male worker was 0.463.  But by 1930 the
ratio had increased to 0.556.  Much of the increase was caused by the movement of women out
of  low-paid  occupations,  such  as  servant  and  manufacturing operative, and into the ranks of
white-collar  workers  in  offices  and  retail  establishments.  The increase in the relative pay of
women  to  men  in  the  early  twentieth  century  rivals  that  in  the  previous  century  when  women
first entered the nascent manufacturing sector.  During 1820 to 1850 the ratio of male to female
wages  rose  from  about 0.35 to 0.50 in manufacturing.  Technological change that circumvented
the  need  for  strength  in  certain industrial activities was the critical factor in the increase in
women=s wages relative to men=s, as well as in the employment of women.  In the first part of
this century women joined the burgeoning clerical sector (see Table 4) and were enabled to do so
by the vast increases in secondary schooling at that time.
But the progress that women made relative to men in their full-time earnings appeared to
come to a halt in the post-World War II period.  Oddly enough this was the period of the greatest
increase  in  wages  in  general  and  in  general  wage  equality.  Recall, as well, that it was also a
period  of  enormous  growth  in  the  labor  force  participation  of married and older women.  A
relationship  exists  between  the  wages  of  women  and  their  increased  participation that eluded
many  researchers who thought it paradoxical that participation rates of women increased while
their relative wages stagnated.
The  relationship  between  wages  and participation derives from that between the
accumulated  job  experience  of  all  working  women  and  changes  in  female labor force
participation.  Even though married women in 1950 spent, on average, only a fraction of their
lifetimes in the labor force, those who entered the labor force at some point actually remained inGoldin -48-
for a long time thereafter.  That is, the labor force participation rate of married women was low,
but those who were in the labor force were relatively continuous workers.
The  connection  between  labor  force  participation  changes  and  wages  can  be  explained
most easily by example.  Assume 20 married women out of 100 participated in the labor force in
1950,  but 40 out of 100 participated in 1970 (not far from the actual numbers).  Under the
assumption  of  work  continuity,  the  20  who  were  in  the  labor  force  in  1950  would  have
accumulated 20 additional years of work experience by 1970.  But the 20 who entered the labor
force from 1950 to 1970 would have accumulated fewer years.  If one woman entered the labor
force each year, then one would have one year of experience by 1970, another would have two
years of experience, and so on until we got to the woman who entered in 1951 who would have
nineteen  years  of  experience.  Thus the work experience of a representative woman in 1970
would be the average over all women in the labor force, or fifteen years.  If, instead, the labor
force  participation  rate  had  not  increased at all, work experience, of the working female
population in 1970, would have been 20 years C or five years more.  Thus the large increase in
participation put a drag on the accumulation of work experience by working women.
This  example  illustrates  exactly what happened to the accumulated experience of
working women in the 1950 to 1980 period.  Because new entrants had little work experience,
they  depressed  the  accumulated  experience  of  all  working  women.  Because the wage is an
average  over  all  working  individuals  and because job experience is an important determinant of
earnings,  the  increased  participation  of women put downward pressure on the wages of all
women.  Part of the stability of the ratio of female to male wages over this period, therefore, is
due to the stability in the job experience of the average female worker.
But  with  each  passing  year the participation of women mounted, and the depressing
impact of the new workers lessened.  By the 1980s the job experience of the average workingGoldin -49-
woman  began  to  increase.  Further, women had made better investments in job skills prior to
entering  the  work  force  and  had  more  realistic  expectations  about  their lifetime of work.  For
these, and other reasons, the ratio of female to male earnings began to climb and has increased
10 percentage points since 1981.  In 1981 the ratio of mean hourly earnings of women to those
of men was 0.637, but in 1991 it was 0.736.  The ratio was even higher for young, educated
women  compared  with  similar  men.  For example, among never-married non-hispanic white 25
to  34  year  olds,  with  more  than  four  years  of  college,  there  was  virtually parity in earnings
between men and women, and among those with only a college degree the gender earnings ratio
was 0.9 in 1991.
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9. Education and Human Capital
The  progress  of  labor  across  the  twentieth  century is closely associated with educational
advances.  The virtual elimination of child labor, the rise of the female labor force, the increase
in  the  ratio  of  women=s  to  men=s  earnings,  the  narrowing  of  the gap between black and white
incomes, the compression of the wage structure in general, and the evolution of various modern
labor market institutions can all be related to educational progress.  Mean years of schooling by
birth  cohort  increased  rather  continuously  for  males  and  females  across  this  century.  A
somewhat  better  view  of  educational progress comes from examining the percentage completing
high school and the proportion attending or graduating from college.  When these indicators are
examined, schooling advance appears less continuous and occurs in particular eras.
High school completion increased by almost four times from 1915 to 1940 rising from 13
percent  of  youths  to  almost 50 percent (see Figure 14).  In the non-southern regions the
graduation rate rose from a higher base and exceeded 50 percent by 1940 (Goldin 1998).  Across
the  nation  young  people,  especially  girls,  sharply  increased  their  attendance  in  high  schoolsGoldin -50-
beginning with cohorts born around 1900 to 1920.  Advances in college education began in the
post-World  War  II  period,  in  part  fueled  by  generous  grants  provided  through  the GI Bill.
College  graduation  (meaning four years or more of college) among young men rose from less
than 15 percent of the 1920 birth cohort to more than 30 percent of the 1950 birth cohort, and
that  for  women  rose from about 7 percent to just below 30 percent between the same birth
cohorts.
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An  oft-cited statistic demonstrating the importance of human capital to American
economic growth comes from the familiar decomposition of the growth residual.  From 1929 to
1982 national income per worker grew at a rate of 1.48 percent average annually.  Conventional
factors (labor hours, capital) can account for only 5 percent of this growth, leaving a residual of
95  percent.  Of that residual, according to Edward Denison, 28 percent can be explained by
increases in formal education (Denison 1985, p. 113).
Human  capital  accumulation  and  technological  change  were  to  the twentieth century
what physical capital accumulation was to the nineteenth century  C  they  were  engines  of
growth.  From 1929 to 1982 human capital formation accounted for almost 60 percent of all
capital  formation.  The increased human capital stock advanced per capita growth in the
twentieth  century  by  more  than any other single measurable factor.  Because much of the
residual  must  owe  to  advances  in  knowledge,  the  role  of  human  capital  formation in the
economic  growth  of  this  century  must  be  extremely  large.  According to standard estimates,
which probably understate the growth of education over time, mean schooling of the male labor
force increased from 7.72 years in 1920 to 10.86 years in 1970 or by 41 percent.
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Less well-known is that advances in secondary schooling account for about 70 percent of
the  increase  in  total  educational attainment from 1930 to 1970 of men 40 to 44 years old.
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Increased high school attendance, not that of college nor elementary school, was responsible for
the enormous increase in the human capital stock during much of this century.
The 1940 federal population census was the first to collect information on the highest
grade  completed  and  earnings,  and  thus  it  provides  the  earliest evidence on which to base a
quantitative study of the returns to education.  But the revolution in American education was
well  underway  before  1940  with  the  expansion  of  high  school  enrollment  and  graduation  from
1915  to  1935.  How incomes and their distribution were affected by the increase in education
across  America is still unclear.  Much has been written about the role schooling played in the
evolution  of  the  female  labor force, which shifted rapidly during the early twentieth century into
office and sales work, from domestic and manufacturing jobs.  But less has been done on the
male labor force.  By 1939 the returns to college graduation relative high school graduation were
exceedingly  high  and  they  were  also  substantial  for  high  school graduation over primary school
education  (see  Goldin  and  Margo  1992).  The new white-collar wage series, discussed above,
suggests that returns to secondary schooling narrowed around 1920.  But because they remained
high until the 1940s, despite a large increase in the relative supply of those with secondary
schooling,  the  relative  demand  for  educated  workers  must  have  shifted  out  rapidly  in  the  1920s
and 1930s (Goldin and Katz 1995).
10. Government and the Labor Market
The  government=s  involvement  in  the  labor  market  through regulation and legislation
increased substantially in the twentieth century.  Because the subject is large and encroaches on
that  in  other  chapters, I will only detail legislation most relevant to the labor market, such as
Workers=  Compensation,  maximum  hours  laws,  immigration restriction and regulation, SocialGoldin -52-
Security,  Unemployment  Insurance, legislation affecting union activity, and anti-discrimination
legislation.
Workers=  Compensation (WC) legislation was the first social insurance passed in the
United States.  These laws, which were passed by the states and exist at the state level today, set
down  a  more  formal procedure for workers injured on the job to file claims against their
employers.  The passage of WC occurred swiftly: it passed 9 states in 1911 and 13 more adopted
it  by  1913.  Forty-four states (including Alaska and Hawaii) passed WC legislation by 1920.
Because  the  previous  system,  that  of  employer  liability,  entailed  greater  costs  to bring suits, for
example  through  the payment of lawyers=  fees,  it  was  thought  that  the  WC  system  was
Aefficiency  enhancing@  and  left  workers  decidedly  better  off.  Two other effects have recently
been explored.  One is that workers may have had their wages reduced after passage of WC if
they were previously paid a compensating differential for more hazardous jobs and if the WC
system  taxed  firms  according  to  their  claims.  Workers still would have benefited from WC
passage  if  the  private  insurance  market did not offer them actuarially-fair insurance.  Another
effect is that workers may have taken greater risks on the job if they faced a higher probability of
collecting  damages  when  injured.  Regulation of the labor market may not always achieve its
intended goals, in this case making the work place safer.
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Also of concern during the Progressive era were the hours of labor and the employment
of  women  and  children.  Maximum hours laws were passed at the state level beginning in the
mid-nineteenth century, but no law constraining the hours of men was found to be constitutional.
In the now famous case of Muller vs. Oregon (1908) the Supreme Court upheld a law passed by
the  state  of  Oregon  restricting  the  hours  of  women  to  ten  per  day  on  the  grounds  that  women
required protection because they bore children.  The Supreme Court decided that the right of the
individual  to  contract  freely  was outweighed by the right of the unborn or, in the economist=sGoldin -53-
language,  that  an  externality existed.  Almost every state passed hours legislation restricting the
hours of women and sometimes children.  A relationship has been found between general hours
declines  during  the  1910  to  1920  period  and  the  legislation,  although  the  precise  causal
relationship  is  unclear  (Goldin  1988).  It is possible that passage of the legislation provided a
means to rally labor=s support for lower hours in general.  Child labor laws were also passed at
the  state  level  and  went  hand-in-hand with compulsory education laws.  At the federal level a
child labor law (the Owen-Keatings Act) was passed in 1916, but its sanction (a tax on the
products of firms employing children under 14 years) was found unconstitutional two years later.
Legislation  restricting  European immigration, in the form of the literacy test, was first
passed by Congress in 1897 but was vetoed by President Cleveland.  The AFL under Samuel
Gompers came out strongly in favor of the literacy test in 1897.  Organized labor and many other
groups  believed  that  immigrants,  particularly  from the most depressed parts of Europe, seriously
reduced the standard of living of America=s working people.  The test again passed Congress in
1913 but was vetoed by Taft, and it passed in 1915 but was vetoed by Wilson.  In the midst of
World War I, with xenophobia on the rise, Congress finally overrode Wilson=s veto and general
immigration restriction began.  It was but a small step from the literacy test to the quotas, which
were passed in 1921 and revised in 1924 and 1929.
52  The final quota act, known as the National
Origins  Act  of  1929,  set  down  very  strict  limitations on immigration from the new sending
regions  of  Europe  (southern, central, and eastern Europe) by basing the quota on the historical
make-up of the American population.  Immigration from Asia was virtually barred, although that
from  Western  Hemisphere  countries remained unrestricted.  It could be argued that the quotas,
by  restricting  the  flow  of  less-skilled immigrant labor, were the single most important piece of
labor legislation in the twentieth century.Goldin -54-
Immigration restriction was left virtually untouched until the Immigration Act of 1965
which  retained  some  of  the  overall  quantitative  controls  of  the  previous  legislation, freed
restrictions on country of origin, but included Western Hemisphere countries in the total pool.  It
also  gave  priority  to  close  family  members  of  American  citizens and allowed for political
refugees.  Each of these changes increased the numbers emigrating from Central America and
Asia,  and  added  to  those  allowed  beyond  the  global  constraint.  As noted previously,
immigration,  legal  and  illegal,  has  increased  so  greatly of late that the proportion of the annual
net  increment  to  total  population  accounted  for  by  net  immigration  is  at  a  historic,  all-time high
(around 38 percent).  Fears that wages in various industries and occupations are being lowered
by  these  Anew@  immigrants  from Asia and Mexico and a longstanding tradition in American
history  of  discriminating  against  Anew@  immigrant  groups  has  led  to  a  new  call  for  drastic
immigration restrictions.
A  host  of  important labor legislation was passed during the 1930s.  It is impossible to
rank  these  landmark  acts  on  the  basis  of  their  relative  importance, and thus I list them in
chronological order.  The Social Security Act passed in 1935, a banner year for major legislation
affecting labor.  The data underlying Figure 6 suggest that passage of social security reduced the
retirement rate of older men but it also shows that the labor force participation rate of older men
had  been  decreasing  for  several decades prior to its passage.  The Social Security Act also
established  unemployment  insurance,  administered  at  the  state  level,  and  the  Wagner  Act,
already  discussed  in  the  section  on  unions, was passed in the same year.  The Fair Labor
Standards Act passed in 1938 and included a provision for the minimum wage and for overtime
pay.  In one brief period labor received social insurance, already a part of most European
economies, the legal right to organize and bargain freely with management, and a guarantee of a
fair wage for those employed.Goldin -55-
The  American  unemployment insurance system differs in several important respects from
that in European countries, and the differences are related to the historical material on
unemployment  discussed  above.  When unemployment insurance was debated and discussed
prior  to  its  passage  in  1935,  one  often-expressed  concern  was  how to reduce unemployment.
Seasonality was viewed as a grave and avoidable problem, and it was hoped that the financing of
unemployment  insurance  through  taxing  firms for their layoffs and dismissals would serve to
reduce the hardship to labor.  The U.S. system of unemployment insurance is the only one of its
kind to experience-rate firms on the basis of their previous unemployment.
53
Recent  labor  legislation  with  substantial  implications  governs  the  hiring,  promoting,  and
firing of minority groups, women, pregnant women, older workers, and those who take leave to
care  for  sick  relatives.  The Civil Rights Act of 1964 covered both minorities and women,
although  Equal  Employment  Opportunity  Commission,  set  up  to  receive  and  investigate charges
of  employment  discrimination,  was  initially  more  vigilant  in  cases  concerning  minorities.  There
is ample evidence that blacks made substantial gains because of the Civil Rights Act and Federal
Contract Compliance, but the case for women is more difficult to establish (Leonard 1986, 1989,
1990).  The Age Discrimination and Employment Act, passed in 1967 and amended in 1978,
prohibits  discrimination  in  hiring,  firing, conditions, and compensation against persons between
40 and 70 years old (with no upper limit in the Federal sector).  The most recent legislation of
this type is the Family and Medical Leave Act (1994) which guarantees, to most employees, the
right to take limited unpaid leave to care for newborns, children, and other sick relatives.
11. Summary
The study of the labor market across the past hundred years reveals enormous progress.
Progress has been made in the rewards of labor C wages, benefits, and increased leisure throughGoldin -56-
shorter  hours,  vacation  time,  sick leave, and earlier retirement.  Labor has been granted added
security on the job and more safety nets when unemployed, ill, and old.  Most of these changes
have occurred within the labor market, as revealed by lower turnover, greater pensions, and more
generous  leave  policies.  Some have been parts of governmental social insurance programs.
Labor  market progress has interacted with societal changes, causing them at some times and
being caused by them at others.  Women=s increased participation in the paid labor force is the
most  significant.  The virtual elimination of child and full-time juvenile labor is another.  The
greater  economic  role  of  women  and  the  decline  in  juvenile  labor  were  fostered  by  various
technological changes and educational advances.
  But  the  study  has  also  revealed  that  some  aspects of the labor market have not
progressed as well and some have come full circle across the past century.  Labor productivity
has been lagging since the 1970s.  It was equally sluggish at other junctures in American history,
but  the  present  has  unique  features.  Ours is longer and is shared by most industrialized
countries.  The recent slowdown in the United States has been accompanied by a widening in the
wage  structure.  No hard evidence causally links the slowdown to rising wage inequality but
their  impacts  are  easily  related.  Rising inequality is a far more serious problem because of the
coincidence.  A stretching in the wage structure is easier to manage in good times than in bad.
Inequality rose in the past and it probably widened to the same extent, but the historical record is
incomplete.  The wage structure was as wide in 1940 as today but there is, to date, no hard
evidence when it began its upward trend.  The wage structure has, therefore, come full circle to
what  it  was  more  than  a  half century ago.  Union strength has also come full circle.  Private
sector unionization is now the same percentage of the non-farm labor force as it was before the
Wagner Act and at the turn of this century.Goldin -57-
The labor market seems a vastly different place than it was a century ago.  Workers are
more skilled, significantly more white-collared, and far less in the manufacturing and
agricultural  sectors.  Labor, it is believed, uses more formal schooling skills, builds more human
capital and greater value to the firm with time on the job.  But there is conflicting evidence on
job tenure across the century and a growing sense today that turnover has increased in the white-
collar sector.  A final issue, and one that has not been addressed here, is how the relationship
between workers and their work changed over history.  The industrial revolution, to some,
created  a  group  of  alienated  employees  whose  skills  were  diminished  by  the  division  of  labor
and machinery.  Have the newer technologies created skilled employees who work in teams, are
empowered by management, and find greater personal identity in their work?Goldin -58-
1. There appears to be no apparent trend over the past 100 years in the level of unemployment, but
the natural rate of unemployment does appear to have risen in the post-World War II period (see
Figure 10).
2. Schooling could also have been denied to the children of middle-income families if the children
could not make credible commitments to their parents to pay back the direct costs of schooling.
Because foregone earnings, not direct costs, were the more important part of total costs of education,
publicly-provided education did not guarantee that children would be sent to school even if the rate
of return to such education was high.
3. That lesser-skilled labor was combined with raw materials to substitute for higher-skilled workers
is a long-standing theme in American economic history having roots in Habakkuk (1962) and given
empirical confirmation in James and Skinner (1985).  See also Wright (1990) who emphasizes the
rise of the United States to world industrial supremacy as depending on its comparative advantage
in raw materials.  I am emphasizing here the production of finished and intermediate products (e.g.,
agricultural  implements,  steel,  automobiles,  hides,  meat,  flour)  and  less raw materials (wheat,
tobacco, cotton).
4. Freeman (1980) provides a fine summary of the changes in the American labor market from 1948
to 1980.
5. The Current Population Survey was altered in 1994 to reflect changes in women=s economic role
(e.g., the questioning is more gender neutral; those who are not employed are queried about job
search more intensively).  Although both the unemployment rate and the labor force participation
rate are affected by the changed survey, the impact on the former is considerably greater than on the
latter.
6.  See Goldin (1990), who revises the female labor force for c.1895.  On the labor force concept and
its evolution see Durand (1948) and Long (1958), among others.
7. Because of changes in occupational definitions I will occasionally compare 1900 with 1970 or
1980, rather than with 1990.
8. Data for 1970 are used in this comparison because census occupational definitions change in the
1980s  and  comparisons  are  difficult  among  the  clerical,  sales,  professional, and managerial
categories.  Note, for example, the apparent growth in the female sales labor force and decline in
the female clerical labor force between 1980 and 1990.
9. The series for only production workers in the manufacturing sector is not very different.
10. Another difference between the series for real non-farm hourly labor productivity and the real
wage series in this chapter is the deflator.  The real hourly productivity series uses the GNP deflator
whereas that for the real wage series uses the consumer price index for most of the period.
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11. There were 3,482,000 non-farm, non-mine (male) laborers in 1900, (Historical Statistics 1975,
series D 182-232).  The 1900 census lists 48,544 male janitors and sextons, 276,958 male servants
and waiters, 73,734 male hucksters and peddlers, 53,625 male porters and helpers, and 538,029 male
draymen, hackmen, and teamsters.  There is no separate listing for mine laborers (U.S. Department
of Commerce and Labor, Bureau of the Census 1904).  Although one might quibble with including
all  draymen,  hackmen,  and  teamsters  in  the  laborer  category,  there  were  many manufacturing
employments requiring no skill that could not be included, particularly those in mining.
12. The decrease in the labor force participation of teenagers is not entirely apparent in Table 1
because some youths in the labor force are also enrolled in school.  In 1990, for example, the labor
force participation rate of all male 16 to 19 years olds was 55.7 percent.  But it is only 32.2 percent
if one excludes those enrolled in school and working part-time.  The double counting of teens at
school and at work arises more in the Current Population Survey than in the census data before
1940.  In fact, it is more likely that the census data before 1940 undercount youths at work, rather
than overcounting them.
13. It should be noted that young people who are in school can also be included in the labor force
and  that  this  is  more  frequent  under  the  labor  force  concept  than  that  of  gainful  employment.
Therefore the proportion of 16 to 19 year old males in the labor force generally increased since 1940
(see Table 1) even though a greater fraction were also in school.  See Goldin and Parsons (1989) on
child labor in the 1890 to 1910 period and why it declined.
14. Moen (1987a, 1987b) estimates the gainful employment concept for the post-1940 period for
consistency with the prior statistics.  The main difference in the two concepts C gainful employment
and the labor force C will be to bias upward the earlier data on labor force.  Men who retired might
still have declared an occupation, even though the enumerators of the census were instructed to
record those who were retired as having no occupation.  The Moen 65+ series is somewhat higher
than the Census 65+ series (see Figure 6) because Moen tries to replicate the gainful employment
concept throughout by using information on weeks employed.
15. The labor force participation rate of 25 to 44 year old males in 1900 was 94.7 percent and that
for the same group in 1990 was 94.3 percent.  But that for women in 1900 was 17.5 percent, whereas
it was 74.9 percent in 1990 (see Table 1).  If the populations of males and females were the same
in this age group, the aggregate labor force participation rate in 1900 would have been 0.846 and
that in 1990 would have been 0.561.  The only change was the increase in women=s participation,
which served to increase the total by about one and one-half times or by 50 percent.
16.  For a more complete discussion of the role of demand and supply shifts in explaining the
increase in female labor force participation see Goldin (1990) chapter 5.
17.  For a recent and novel alternative interpretation that gives far less weight to the laws, see
Freeman (1998).
18. This is Ulman=s (1966) thesis.Goldin -60-
19. The AFL claims it was established in 1881 with the founding of the Federation of Trades and
Labor Organizations.  Most historians use the 1886 date.
20.  The  Clayton  Antitrust Act, passed in 1914 clarified that Congress did not intend antitrust
legislation to mean that unions were in restraint of trade.  But later interpretations revealed that the
act did not exempt unions from the antitrust laws, nor did it give unions relief from injunctions as
Congress appeared to have intended.
21. A simple estimation of the union wage premium is hampered by the fact that union members
tend to be more skilled than non-union members.
22.  See Kerr (1954), on the 1950s, Nelson (1975), on the early 1900s, Edwards (1979), on the
historical evolution, and Doeringer and Piore (1971), on the twentieth century.
23.  See, for the earlier period, Goldin and Margo (1991), Carter and Sutch (1991), and Sundstrom
(1990).
24. Carter (1988) and Carter and Savoca (1990) claim that jobs are not lengthier now than in the
past.  Jacoby and Sharma (1992), however, dispute their treatment of the subject and defend the
conventional wisdom that job tenure has increased over the twentieth century.
25. See Raff (1988) for a discussion of this thesis and an alternative explanation for the five-dollar
day.
26.  Allen (1995) finds no evidence for an interindustry wage differential over long periods of time
for nonproduction workers.
27. The Lebergott series can be found in Lebergott (1964) and, in part, in Historical Statistics (1975)
series D 85-86.  The Romer series is in Romer (1986a, 1986b), although see Weir (1992) for a
critical review.  See also Lebergott (1992) for a critique of Romer.
28. For a criticism of Romer=s claim that the Lebergott numbers are excessively volatile for the 1900
to 1929 period see Weir (1992), who agrees that the 1890 to 1899 data are excessively volatile.
29. I assume here that unemployment among farmers in 1894 was equal to what it was in a non-
recession  year.  It was 1.4 percent in 1900, which was a non-recession year (see Goldin and
Engerman 1993).  Farmers were 20 percent of the labor force in 1900.
30. See Margo=s (1993b) excellent and balanced survey of the literature.
31. See Darby (1976) for a defense of excluding WPA workers, who are in the official BLS-
Lebergott  unemployment series, from the ranks of the unemployed, and Kesselman and Savin
(1978), for a critique of Darby.  Margo (1988) provides a reasoned view of the two extreme cases.
32. See Juhn, Murphy, and Topel (1991) on recent estimates, and Margo (1990a) for a comparisonGoldin -61-
of data for the 1970s with those for 1910.  Keyssar (1986) contains a fine discussion of the evolution
of the notion of unemployment in the United States.
33. It should be mentioned that the state BLS data, for all their virtues as quantitative windows on
the past and on working-class people, are curious and puzzling documents.  There is no precise
record concerning how the samples of workers, families, and firms were drawn.  They appear to
have  been  collected  in  a  haphazard  manner,  often  compiled  from  relatively  small numbers of
individuals who mailed in their questionnaires.  The questionnaires were generally distributed non-
randomly by unions or in working-class neighborhoods.  It is likely that many of the unemployed,
such as transients and tramps, were not reached, although those who tramped would have been
difficult  to  reach  by  even  a  well-designed  sample.  See Keyssar (1986) on tramping and the
unemployed.
34. On recall as the route out of UI, see Katz (1986) and Katz and Meyer (1990).
35. There is a potential bias, however, in the state BLS data if unemployed workers exited the
population from which the sample was drawn and other unemployed workers did not replace them.
Even if the bias were present, however, it is not likely to alter the results significantly.
36. See Goldin and Margo (1991) for the historical data and Allen (1981) for the more recent
numbers.
37. In Kansas the elasticity was -0.7, but in Maine it was small with a large standard error.
38. On seasonality see Goldin and Engerman (1993) and Kuznets (1933).
39. On the recent wage structure expansion see Katz and Murphy (1992).
40. The figure is 39 percent if only white men are considered (see Goldin and Margo 1992, table 1).
The convergence between black and white incomes held in check some of the unraveling in the
wage structure.
41. See Goldin and Margo (1992) on the Agreat compression@ of the 1940s.  Miller (1955, 1958,
1966) provides a contemporary portrait on the wage structure and the income distribution for 1940
to 1960.  For the income distribution using IRS data from the 1920s to the 1940s see Kuznets (1953)
and Goldsmith (1967).
42. This is part of the Kuznets thesis; see also Williamson and Lindert (1980).
43. The premium is inferred to be due to education because it is the ratio of the wage of white collar
to blue collar (laborer or unskilled manufacturing) workers.
44. On the skill differential literature for the pre-1940 period, see, for example, Keat (1960), Ober
(1948), and the summary in Williamson and Lindert (1980).Goldin -63-
45. By 50-10 (and 90-50) is meant the ratio of the wage at the 50th (90th) percentile to that at the
10th (50th) percentile.
46. See Ehrenberg and Smith (1991), table 3.3 for the nominal value of the minimum wage and the
ratio of the minimum wage to the average wage in manufacturing directly before and just following
passage.
47. Numbers were calculated by the author from the March Current Population Survey data.  See
Goldin (1990) on the gender earnings gap and on the role of changing expectations regarding labor
market experience.  O=Neill and Polachek (1993) contains recent data and analyzes why the 1980s
brought an increase in the ratio of female to male earnings.  Blau and Kahn (1994) discuss the role
of the wage structure.  Rising inequality since the late 1970s has meant that women were swimming
upstream.  They would have gained one-third more relative to men had the wage structure not
expanded.
48.  The  college  graduation  numbers  come  from  Current  Population  Reports  by  using  data  on
schooling completed for older cohorts.  They could be upwardly biased for those who would have
graduated in the pre-1960 period the same way that high school graduation data from the 1940 and
1950 censuses are for those who would have graduated before the early 1930s.  See Goldin (1997)
on college graduation rates, Goldin (1990) for women=s schooling in general, and Smith and Welch
(1989) for schooling differentials between blacks and whites.  Goldin (1998) presents estimates for
public and private graduation and secondary school enrollment rates in the 1910 to 1960 period
using contemporaneous data from the Commissioner of Education and other sources.  Such data are
less  afflicted by  Acreep@  than  those  obtained  from  the  1940  and  later  censuses  or  the  Current
Population Reports.
49. The mean schooling figures are from Smith and Ward (1984).
50. The figure would be 85 percent if all of the increased education in the primary grades needed
to advance students to the secondary grades was included.  It would be reduced to 58 percent by
subtracting the 0.46 years, on average, of education needed to advance those in the grades five
through seven to eighth grade (see Goldin 1998, table 1).
51. See Fishback and Kantor (1995) for an analysis of the wage effects from passage of Workers=
Compensation.
52. See Goldin (1994) for an analysis of why immigration restriction passed.
53. A standard and superb historical work on the subject is Nelson (1969).  For various reasons the
experience rating system is incomplete, and many sectors and firms that reach the maximum tax
(e.g., autos, construction) have little incentive to reduce unemployment.List of Figures and Tables
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16-19a 20-24 25-44 45-64 $ 65 16-19a 20-24 25-44 45-64 $ 65 All Ages All Ages
Current Population Survey (annual averages)
1990 55.7 84.3 94.3 80.4 16.4 51.8 71.6 74.9 59.2 8.7 0.45
1980 62.0 87.0 95.5 82.2 19.1 53.3 69.2 65.5 50.9 8.1 0.42
1970 58.4 86.6 96.8 89.3 26.8 44.0 57.8 47.9 49.3 9.7 0.37
1960 59.4 90.2 97.7 92.0 33.1 39.4 46.2 39.9 44.3 10.8 0.33
Decennial Census
1970 47.2 80.9 94.3 87.2 24.8 34.9 56.1 47.5 47.8 10.0 0.37
1960 50.0 86.2 95.3 89.0 30.5 32.6 44.8 39.1 41.6 10.3 0.32
1950 51.7 81.9 93.3 88.2 41.4 31.1 42.9 33.3 28.8 7.8 0.28
1940 34.7 88.1 94.9 88.7 41.8 24.8 45.6 30.5 20.2 6.1 0.25 0.11
1930 40.1 88.8 95.8 91.0 54.0 22.8 41.8 24.6 18.0 7.3 0.22
1920 51.5 89.9 95.6 90.7 55.6 28.4 37.5 21.7 16.5 7.3 0.20
1910d n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.  n.a.
1900 62.0 90.6 94.7 90.3 63.1 26.8 31.7 17.5 13.6 8.3 0.18 0.26
1890 50.0 90.9 96.0 92.0 68.3 24.5 30.2 15.1 12.1 7.6 0.17Table 1, continued
a The labor force participation of 16-19 year olds is overcounted in the Current Population Survey compared with U.S. decennial census, particularly
during the period before 1940.  Many employed teenagers were also at school.  See text.
b Females/All is the fraction of the entire labor force composed of women (of all ages).
c Foreign born/All is the fraction of the non-agricultural labor force composed of foreign-born whites.
d The data for 1910 overcount certain types of workers, in comparison with other censuses, by including unpaid farm and family help.
Sources:
1890-1970: Historical Statistics (1975), series D 29-41; 1980: Employment and Earnings, vol. 28, no. 1, table 4; 1990: Employment and
Earnings, vol. 38, no. 1, table 3 for 1990.  FB/All 1900: U.S. Department of Commerce and Labor, Bureau of the Census (1904), table 2; 1940:
U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census (1943).Table 2: Industrial Distribution of Employees on Nonagricultural Payrolls, 1900 to 1990 (in percentages)








Trade FIREa Services Governmen
t
Total
1990 5.3 17.4 22.7 5.3 23.5 6.1 25.7 16.7 77.3
1980 6.0 22.4 28.4 5.7 22.5 5.7 19.8 17.9 71.6
1970 5.6 27.4 33.0 6.4 21.1 5.2 16.5 17.8 67.0
1960 6.6 31.0 37.6 7.4 21.0 4.9 13.7 15.4 62.4
1950 7.2 33.7 40.9 8.9 20.8 4.2 11.9 13.3 59.1
1940 6.9 33.9 40.8 9.4 20.8 4.6 11.4 13.0 59.2
1930 8.1 32.5 40.6 12.5 19.7 5.0 11.5 10.7 59.4
1920 7.4 39.0 46.4 15.7 14.6 3.3 11.3 8.6 53.5
1910 11.1 36.1 47.2 15.5 16.5 2.2 11.1 7.5 52.8
1900 11.8 36.0 47.8 15.0 16.5 2.0 11.5 7.2 52.2
a FIRE = finance, insurance, and real estate.
Notes: Because these data are derived from payroll information, they exclude the self employed and may double-count those with multiple
employers.
Sources: 1900-1970 Historical Statistics (1975), series D 127-141; 1980-1990 Employment and Earnings, vol. 39, no. 1, table 65 for 1990,





c 1940 1930 1920 1910 1900
White-collar workers 57.1 53.9 47.9 42.3 36.7 31.1 29.4 24.9 21.4 17.6
  Professional, technical 16.7 16.5 14.7 11.4 8.6 7.5 6.8 5.4 4.7 4.3
  Managers, officials, proprietors 12.6 12.0 8.2 8.5 8.8 7.3 7.4 6.6 6.6 5.8
  Clerical 15.8 18.6 17.9 14.9 12.3 9.6 8.9 8.0 5.3 3.0
  Sales 12.0 6.8 7.2 7.5 7.0 6.7 6.3 4.9 4.7 4.5
Manual and service workers 40.0 43.2 49.0 51.4 51.4 51.5 49.4 48.1 47.7 44.9
  Manual 26.6 31.1 36.3 39.7 41.0 39.8 39.6 40.2 38.2 35.8
    Craft, supervisors 11.6 13.3 13.8 14.3 14.2 12.0 12.8 13.0 11.6 10.5
    Operatives 10.9 13.5 17.8 19.9 20.3 18.4 15.8 15.6 14.6  12.8
    Laborers (except farm, mine) 4.1 4.3 4.7 5.5 6.6 9.4 11.0 11.6 12.0 12.5
  Service 13.4 12.1 12.7 11.8 10.4 11.7 9.8 7.8 9.6 9.0
    Private household 0.7 0.8 1.5 2.8 2.6 4.7 4.1 3.3 5.0 5.4
    Other service 12.7 11.3 11.2 9.0 7.8 7.1 5.7 4.5 4.6 3.6
Farm workers 2.9 2.9 3.1 6.3 11.9 17.4 21.2 27.0 30.9 37.5
  Farmers, farm managers n.a. 1.7 1.8 3.9 7.5 10.4 12.4 15.3 16.5 19.9
  Farm laborers, supervisors n.a. 1.2 1.3 2.4 4.4 7.0 8.8 11.7 14.4 17.7Table 3, continued
a Occupational classifications change between 1980 and 1990.  Some occupations in the clerical group are assigned to the sales category, and there
are reclassifications between the professional and managerial groups.  The laborer category in 1990 includes handlers, equipment cleaners, helpers,
and laborers.  Operatives are machine operators, assemblers, and inspectors.  Craft and supervisors include precision production, craft, and repair
workers.  Clerical workers are administrative support workers, including clerical.
b Greater than or equal to 14 years old, for consistency with previous years; difference with greater than or equal to 16 years old is slight.
c Uses 1960 occupational classifications.
n.a. = not available
Notes: The data source for 1970, 1960, and 1950 has a separate category for the “currently unemployed.”  In 1970 the currently unemployed were
6.5 percent of the labor force; they were 5.1 percent in 1960 and 2.3 percent in 1950.  The table figures for those years give, instead, the fraction
of the currently employed labor force.  Figures may not sum properly due to rounding.
Sources: 1900-1970 Historical Statistics (1975), series D 182-232; 1980-1990 Employment and Earnings.Table 4: Occupational Distribution of the Non-Farm Labor Force, by Sex: 1900 to 1990 (in percentages)
1990a 1980 1970b 1960c 1950c 1940 1930 1920 1910 1900
Male Non-Farm Labor Force Participants
White-collar workers 48.1 44.2 41.7 38.7 36.0 34.0 33.5 30.7 30.9 30.1
  Professional, technical 15.7 16.2 14.8 11.4 8.5 7.4 6.4 5.5 5.3 5.8
  Managers, officials, proprietors 14.5 15.0 11.6 11.8 12.4 10.9 11.6 11.2 11.6 11.7
  Clerical 6.2 6.7 7.9 7.8 7.7 7.4 7.3 7.6 6.7 4.8
  Sales 11.7 6.3 7.4 7.7 7.4 8.2 8.1 6.5 7.1 7.8
Manual and service workers 51.9 55.9 58.3 61.3 64.0 66.0 66.5 69.3 69.1 69.9
  Manual 41.8 46.7 49.8 54.3 56.7 58.3 60.1 63.9 63.2 64.5
    Craft, supervisors 20.3 21.9 22.1 22.5 22.4 19.8 21.5 23.0 21.6 21.6
    Operatives 15.0 17.5 20.5 23.2 24.1 23.0 20.4 20.7 19.2 17.8
    Laborers (except mine) 6.5 7.3 7.2 8.5 10.2 15.5 18.2 20.2 22.4 25.2
  Service 10.2 9.2 8.6 7.1 7.3 7.7 6.4 5.4 5.9 5.4
    Private household 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.4
    Other service 10.2 9.1 8.5 6.9 7.1 7.3 6.1 5.1 5.6 5.0Table 4, continued
1990a 1980 1970b 1960c 1950c 1940 1930 1920 1910 1900
Female Non-Farm Labor Force Participants
White-collar workers 71.4 66.4 61.8 57.4 54.7 46.8 48.3 44.9 31.0 22.0
  Professional, technical 18.8 17.0 15.6 13.5 12.8 13.3 15.1 13.5 11.6 10.1
  Managers, officials, proprietors 11.2 7.0 3.7 3.9 4.5 3.4 3.0 2.6 2.4 1.7
  Clerical 28.1 35.5 35.1 31.5 28.5 22.4 22.8 21.6 11.0 4.9
  Sales 13.2 6.9 7.4 8.5 8.9 7.7 7.5 7.2 6.0 5.3
Manual and service workers 28.6 33.6 38.2 42.6 45.3 53.2 51.7 55.1 69.0 78.0
  Manual 10.7 13.9 17.9 19.4 23.1 22.5 21.7 27.5 30.5 34.3
    Craft, supervisors 2.2 1.8 1.9 1.3 1.6 1.1 1.1 1.4 1.7 1.8
    Operatives 6.9 10.8 15.0 17.5 20.6 20.3 19.0 23.4 27.1 29.3
    Laborers (except mine) 1.6 1.2 1.0 0.6 0.9 1.1 1.6 2.7 1.7 3.2
  Service 17.9 19.7 20.4 23.2 22.2 30.7 30.0 27.6 38.5 43.7
    Private household 1.4 2.5 3.9 8.5 9.1 18.9 19.4 18.2 28.5 35.4
    Other service 16.5 17.2 16.5 14.6 13.0 11.8 10.6 9.4 10.0 8.3Table 4, continued
a Occupational classifications change with 1990.  Some occupations in the clerical group are assigned to the sales category, and there are
reclassifications between the professional and managerial groups.  The laborer category in 1990 includes handlers, equipment cleaners, helpers,
and laborers.  Operatives are machine operators, assemblers, and inspectors.  Craft and supervisors include precision production, craft, and repair
workers.  Clerical workers are administrative support workers, including clerical.
b Greater than or equal to 14 years old, for consistency with previous years.  Difference with greater than or equal to 16 years old is slight.
c Uses 1960 occupational classifications.
Notes: Columns may not sum to 100 percent due to rounding error.
Sources: 1900-1970 Historical Statistics (1975), series D 182-232; 1980-1990 Employment and Earnings, vol. 38, no. 1, table 21 for 1990,
vol. 28, no. 1, table 22 for 1980.Table 5: Self-Employed as a Percentage of Non-Farm (White) Males by Age: 1910, 1940, and 1990
Age 1910 1940 1990
25-34 13.9 9.6 8.7
35-44 22.5 15.6 12.7
45-54 27.3 18.3 14.4
55-64 30.6 20.3 19.2
25-64 21.5 14.9 12.5
Notes: The 1910 census asked whether an individual was an employee, employer, or “works on own
account.”  For 1910, self-employment is defined here as employer or “works on own account.”  Some who
gave the latter answer may not have been self-employed but were out of the labor force.  It is doubtful that
all but a few in the age groups given were out of the labor force.  I excluded all men with farm-related
occupations.  The 1940 census asked class of worker, among which “employer” and “works on own
account” were possible responses.  A far greater fraction of the self-employed in 1940 than in 1910 listed
themselves as “works on own account.”  The percentages listed above exclude those “out of the labor
force.”  To the extent that some individuals in 1910 were not in the labor force, the difference in the two
years in the level of self employment is understated.  The 1940 percentages exclude the agricultural
population.  In the 1990 Current Population Survey self-employment is defined as “self employed, not
incorporated.”  Only currently employed white males are included in all censuses.
Sources: 1910 Public Use Microdata Sample, 1940 Public Use Microdata Sample, 1990 Current






1982 35.6 51.1 .696
1977 39.0 52.8 .739
1972 43.3 57.7 .750
1967 45.7 60.5 .755
1954 43.1 55.2 .791
1931 35.9 n.a. n.a.
1921 33.7 40.2 .838
1909 23.6 27.5 .859
1899 22.0 23.7 .928
n.a. = not available
Sources and Notes: 1899-1967 Historical Statistics (1975), series P 1, 4, 5.  Establishments are
factories, excluding hand and neighborhood industries such as blacksmith shops.  1972-1982 U.S.
Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census (1988), table 1a.  There is perfect agreement between
Historical Statistics and the later source for the years of overlap.Table 7: Labor Force Participation Rates of 10 to 15 Year Olds and Fraction Working in Agriculture:
1880, 1900, and 1930
1880 1900 1930
Labor force participation rates of youths, 10 to 15 years old
Males 24.4 26.1 6.4
Females 9.0 6.4 2.9
Percentage of 10 to 15 year old working youths in agricultural
employment
Males 70.9 67.6 74.5
Females 46.4 74.5 61.3
Sources:
1880, 1900 U.S. Department of Commerce and Labor, Bureau of the Census (1904, p. cxlviii, cxlix)
1930 U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census (1933), tables 1, 3.
Notes:
Percentage of working youths in agriculture is the percentage of all child labor, for the sex and age group
given, laboring in the agricultural sector.Table 8: Distribution of Unemployment for Manufacturing Workers: by State, 1880s-1890s, and for the United States, 1910

















No unemployment 67.9 37.2 48.4 38.9
68.1 74.1 68.4
1 day < 1 week 2.5 2.1 0.1 1.8
1 < 2 weeks 2.8 2.2 1.1 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4
2 weeks < 1 month 4.2 5.0 5.4 16.8 2.3 2.3 2.1
1 < 2 months 6.8 13.1 11.4 21.6 4.6 4.6 4.3
2 < 3 months 5.6 11.6 12.9 11.2 5.1 5.0 4.9
3 < 4 months 3.3 10.9 13.8 4.5 3.9 3.8 3.6
4 < 5 months 2.2 5.4 3.9 2.1 1.6 1.4 1.7
5 < 6 months 3.2 5.6 2.6 0.6 1.4 1.2 1.4
$ 6 months 1.8 7.0 0.5 2.0 12.7 7.2 13.2
Days unemployed
b 62.3 80.8 69.9 40.3 –  – –
Weeks unemployed – – – – 12.5 12.4 13.2
% with unemployment
c 32.2% 62.8% 51.6% 62.2% 31.9% 25.9% 31.7%
Workyear, days
d 306.5 306.3 302.6 303.6 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Unemployment rate
e 6.5 16.6 11.9 8.2 7.7 6.2 8.0
Number of observations 2398 1057 746 4412 14389 12834 21054Table 8, continued
a Including only manufacturing workers who were employed on April 15, 1910.
b Days unemployed conditional on experiencing any unemployment.
c Percentage who experienced any unemployment during the year.
d Total days in the work year is computed as (annual earning/daily wage) + days lost due to having no work, sickness, and other causes.  Individuals
whose total days exceeded 365 were deleted from the sample.
e The unemployment rate is given by the mean number of days (or weeks) unemployed divided by the total number of days in the workyear.  For 1910
the number of weeks worked each year is taken to be 52.  The number of days worked per week does not affect the estimate of the unemployment
rate.
Notes: In all cases the sample consists of males, less than 65 years old, whose occupations and industries suggested they were employed by firms (that
is, they were not self-employed).  The variable used for California, Kansas, and Maine is the number of days the worker lost time due to “no work,”
as opposed to sickness or other causes.  In Michigan, where days lost was not broken down by cause, the distribution is given only if the cause for the
spells was an involuntary one.  In the case of two or more causes, indicating several spells with different causes, the time was allocated to the voluntary
reason (e.g., illness, vacation).  Thus the percentage experiencing no unemployment spells is a lower bound to the true value.  The data for Michigan
refer to workers in firms that manufactured furniture.
Sources: 1910 Public Use Microdata Sample; Carter, et al. (1990) for state BLS data.  The entries for the distribution of unemployment may not sum
to 100 percent due to rounding error.Table 9: Black Male Wages as a Percentage of White Male Wages by Labor Market Cohort
Median Year of Initial
Labor Market Work
Census Year
1940 1950 1960 1970 1980
1978 84.2
1973 75.1 76.6
1968 60.2 70.1 73.5
1963 61.8 59.1 66.2 71.2
1958 46.7 60.0 59.4 62.8 67.8
1953 47.5 58.3 58.4 62.7 66.9
1948 44.4 56.6 57.6 60.6 66.5
1943 44.4 54.1 56.2 60.0 68.5
1938 42.3 53.2 53.8 60.3







All 43.4 55.2 57.5 64.4 72.6
Notes: “Median year of initial labor market work” is derived from information on education and age and is
approximate.  “All” means across all of the labor market cohorts.
Source: Smith and Welch (1989), table 8.References
Note: Several U.S. government publications are referenced in the text, notes, figures, and tables in
abbreviated form.  They are, with the “author” in parentheses, The Economic Report of the President
(U.S. Council of Economic Advisers) National Income and Product Accounts (U.S. Department of
the Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis), Historical Statistics (1975; U.S. Department of
Commerce, Bureau of the Census), and Employment and Earnings (Department of Labor, Bureau
of Labor Statistics).  The full citations are given below, in the usual manner, by “author.”
Allen, Steven G.  (1981) “An Empirical Model of Work Attendance,” Review of Economics and
Statistics 63 (January): 77-87.
Allen, Steven G.  (1987) “Relative Wage Variability in the United States, 1860-1983,” Review of
Economic and Statistics 69 (November): 617-26.
Allen, Steven G. (1995) “Updated Notes on the Interindustry Wage Structure, 1890-1990,” Industrial
and Labor Relations Review 48 (January): 305-21.
Beney, M. Ada.  (1936)  Wages, Hours, and Employment in the United States, 1914-1936.  New
York: National Industrial Conference Board.
Blau, Francine D., and Lawrence M. Kahn.  (1994)  “Rising Wage Inequality and the U.S. Gender Gap,”
American Economic Review 84 (May): 23-28.
Bound, John, and Richard Freeman.  (1992)  “What Went Wrong? The Erosion of Relative Earnings and
Employment among Young Black Men in the 1980s,”  Quarterly Journal of Economics 107
(February): 201-32.
Card, David, and Alan Krueger.  (1992) “School Quality and Black-White Relative Earnings: A Direct
Assessment,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 107 (February): 151-200.
Carter, Susan B.  (1988) “The Changing Importance of Lifetime Jobs in the U.S. Economy, 1892-1978,”
Industrial Relations 27 (Fall): 287-300.
Carter, Susan B., and Elizabeth Savoca.  (1990)  “Labor Mobility and Lengthy Jobs in Nineteenth-
Century America,” Journal of Economic History 50 (March): 1-16.
Carter, Susan B., and Richard Sutch.  (1991) “Sticky Wages, Short Weeks, and "Fairness": The
Response of Connecticut Manufacturing Firms to the Depression of 1893-94.” Historical Labor
Statistics Project, University of California at Berkeley, Working Paper No. 2.
Carter, Susan B., Richard Sutch, and Roger Ransom.  (1990) “Codebook and User’s Manual: Surveyof 3,493 Wage Earners in California in 1892, Reported in the Fifth Biennial Report of the California
Bureau of Labor Statistics for 1893.”
“Codebook and User’s Manual: A Survey of 1,165 Workers in Kansas, 1884-1887, Reported
in the First, Second, and Third Annual Reports of the Kansas Bureau of Labor and Industrial Statistics.”
“Codebook and User’s Manual: A Survey of 1,084 Workers in Maine, 1890, Reported in the Fifth
Annual Report of the Maine Bureau of Industrial and Labor Statistics.”
“Codebook and User’s Manual: A Survey of 5,419 Workers in Michigan, 1889, Reported in the
Seventh Annual Report of the Michigan Bureau of Labor and Industrial Statistics.”  Berkeley: Institute
of Business and Economic Research.
Coombs, Whitney.  (1926) The Wages of Unskilled Labor in Manufacturing Industries in the United
States, 1890-1924.  New York: Columbia University Press.
Costa, Dora.  (1993) Health, Income, and Retirement: Evidence from Nineteenth Century America.
Ph.D. dissertation.  Department of Economics.  University of Chicago.
Costa, Dora. (1998) The Evolution of Retirement: An American Economic History, 1880-1990.
Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Cullen, Donald.  (1956)  “The Interindustry Wage Structure: 1899-1950,” American Economic Review
46 (June): 353-69.
Darby,  Michael.  (1976) “Three-and-a-half Million U.S. Employees Have Been Mislaid: Or, an
Explanation of Unemployment, 1934-1941,” Journal of Political Economy 84 (February): 1-26.
Denison, Edward F.  (1985) Trends in American Economic Growth, 1929-1982.  Washington, D.C.:
The Brookings Institution.
Doeringer, Peter B., and Michael J. Piore.  (1971) Internal Labor Markets and Manpower Analysis.
Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath.
Donohue, John H. III, and James P. Heckman.  (1991) “Continuous Versus Episodic Change: The Impact
of Civil Rights Policy on the Economic Status of Blacks,” Journal of Economic Literature 29
(December): 1603-43.
Douglas, Paul H. (1930) Real Wages in the United States: 1890-1926.  Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
Dulles, Foster Rhea and Melvyn Dubofsky.  (1993) Labor in America: A History. Fifth edition.
Arlington Heights, IL: Harlan Davidson Inc.
Durand, John.  (1948) The Labor Force in the United States, 1890-1960.  New York: Social Science
Research Council.Edwards, Richard.  (1979) Contested Terrain: The Transformation of the Workplace in the
Twentieth Century.  New York: Basic Books.
Ehrenberg, Ronald G., and Robert S. Smith.  (1991) Modern Labor Economics: Theory and Public
Policy.  New York: Harper Collins.
Fishback, Price V., and Shawn Everett Kantor.  (1995) “Did Workers Pay for the Passage of Workers’
Compensation Laws?” Quarterly Journal of Economics 110 (August): 713-42.
Freeman, Richard.  (1980) “The Evolution of the American Labor Market, 1948-80.”  In Martin
Feldstein, ed., The American Economy in Transition.  Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press for
the NBER: 349-96.
Freeman, Richard. (1998) “Spurts in Union Growth: Defining Moments and Social Processes.”  In Michael
Bordo, Claudia Goldin, and Eugene White, eds., The Defining Moment: The Great Depression and
the American Economy in the Twentieth Century.  Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press: 265-
295.
Freeman, Richard, and Joel Rogers.  (1992) “Who Speaks for Us?  Employee Representation in a Non-
Union Labor Market.”  Unpublished working paper.
Friedman, Gerald.  (1988) “Strike Success and Union Ideology: The United States and France, 1880-
1914,” Journal of Economic History 48 (March): 1-26.
Friedman, Gerald.  (1993) “New Estimates of Union Membership: The United States, 1880-1914.”
Unpublished manuscript.
Goldin, Claudia.  (1986) “The Female Labor Force and American Economic Growth: 1890 to 1980.”
In Stanley Engerman and Robert Gallman, eds., Long-Term Factors in American Economic Growth,
Conference on Income and Wealth, vol. 51.  Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press
Goldin, Claudia.  (1988) “Maximum Hours Legislation and Female Employment in the 1920's: A
Reassessment,” Journal of Political Economy 96 (February): 189-205.
Goldin, Claudia.  (1990) Understanding the Gender Gap: An Economic History of American Women.
New York: Oxford University Press.
Goldin, Claudia.  (1991) “The Role of World War II in the Rise of Women’s Employment,” American
Economic Review 81 (September): 741-56.
Goldin, Claudia.  (1994) “The Political Economy of Immigration Restriction in the United States: 1890 to
1921.”  In Claudia Goldin and Gary Libecap, The Regulated Economy: A Historical Approach to
Political Economy.  Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.Goldin, Claudia.  (1995) “The c-Shaped Female Labor Force Function in Economic Development and
Economic History.”  In T. Paul Schultz, ed., Investment in Women’s Human Capital and Economic
Development.  Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Goldin, Claudia.  (1997)  “Career and Family: College Women Look to the Past.” In F. Blau and R.
Ehrenberg, eds., Gender and Family Issues in the Workplace.  New York: Russell Sage Press.
Goldin, Claudia.  (1998) “America’s Graduation from High School: The Evolution and Spread of
Secondary Schooling in the Twentieth Century,” Journal of Economic History 58 (June): forthcoming.
Goldin, Claudia, and Stanley Engerman.  (1993) “Seasonality in Nineteenth Century American Labor
Markets.”  In Donald Schaefer and Thomas Weiss, eds., Economic Development in Historical
Perspective.  Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Goldin, Claudia, and Lawrence F. Katz.  (1995) “The Decline of ‘Non-Competing Groups’: Changes in
the Premium to Education, 1890 to 1940.” National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper,
No. 5202 (August).
Goldin, Claudia, and Robert A. Margo. (1991) “Downtime: Voluntary and Involuntary Unemployment of
the Past and Present.”  Paper presented to the Kansas Conference on Historical Labor Statistics, July.
Goldin, Claudia, and Robert A. Margo.  (1992) “The Great Compression: The Wage Structure in the
United States at Mid-Century,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 107 (February): 1-34.
Goldin, Claudia, and Donald Parsons.  (1989) “Parental Altruism and Self-Interest: Child Labor among
Late-Nineteenth Century American Families,” Economic Inquiry 27 (October): 637-659.
Goldsmith, Selma F.  (1967) “Changes in the Size Distribution of Income.”  In E. C. Budd, ed., Inequality
and Poverty.  New York: Harper and Row.
Habakkuk, H.J.  (1962) American and British Technology in the Nineteenth Century: The Search
for Labour-Saving Inventions.  Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press.
Heckman, James J., and Brook S. Paynor.  (1991) “Determining the Impact of Federal Antidiscrimination
Policy on the Economic Status of Blacks: A Study of South Carolina,” American Economic Review
79 (March): 138-77.
Jacoby, Sanford M.  (1984) “The Development of Internal Labor Markets in American Manufacturing
Firms.”  In Paul Osterman, ed., Internal Labor Markets.  Cambridge, MA: M.I.T. Press.
Jacoby, Sanford M.  (1985) Employing Bureaucracy: Managers, Unions, and the Transformation
of Work in American Industry, 1900-1945.  New York: Columbia University Press.Jacoby, Sanford M., and Sunil Sharma. (1992) “Employment Duration and Industrial Labor Mobility in
the United States, 1880-1980,” Journal of Economic History 52 (March): 161-79.
James, John A., and Jonathan Skinner.  (1985) “The Resolution of the Labor-Scarcity Paradox,” Journal
of Economic History 45 (September): 513-40.
Jones, Ethel.  (1963) “New Estimates of Hours of Work per Week and Hourly Earnings, 1900-1957,”
Review of Economics and Statistics 45 (November): 374-85.
Juhn, Chinhui, Kevin M. Murphy, and Robert H. Topel.  (1991) “Why Has the Natural Rate of
Unemployment Increased over Time?” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 0 (2) 1991: 75-126.
Katz, Lawrence F.  (1986) “Layoffs, Recall and the Duration of Unemployment.” NBER Working Paper
No. 1825.
Katz, Lawrence F., and Bruce D. Meyer.  (1990) “Unemployment Insurance, Recall Expectations and
Unemployment Outcomes.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 105 (November): 973-1002.
Katz, Lawrence F., and Kevin M. Murphy.  (1992) “Changes in Relative Wages, 1963-87: Supply and
Demand Factors,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 107 (February): 35-78.
Keat, Paul.  (1960) “Long-Run Changes in Occupational Wage Structure, 1900-1956,” Journal of
Political Economy 68 (December): 584-600.
Kerr, Clark.  (1954) “The Balkanization of Labor Markets.”  In E. Wight Bakke, et al., Labor Mobility
and Economic Opportunity.  New York: Technology Press of M.I.T. and Wiley.
Kesselman, Jonathan R., and N. E. Savin.  (1978) “Three-and-a-Half Million Workers Never Were
Lost,” Economic Inquiry 16 (April): 205-25.
Keyssar, Alexander.  (1986) Out of Work: The First Century of Unemployment in Massachusetts.
New York: Cambridge University Press.
Krueger, Alan B., and Lawrence H. Summers.  (1987) “Reflections on the Inter-Industry Wage
Structure.”  In Kevin Lang and Jonathan Leonard, eds., Unemployment and the Structure of Labor
Markets.  Oxford: Basil Blackwell Publishers. 17-47.
Kuznets, Simon.  (1933) Seasonal Variations in Industry and Trade. New York: National Bureau of
Economic Research.
Kuznets, Simon.  (1953) Shares of Upper Income Groups in Income and Savings.  New York:
National Bureau of Economic Research.Lebergott, Stanley.  (1964) Manpower in Economic Growth: The American Record since 1800.  New
York: McGraw-Hill Inc.
Lebergott, Stanley.  (1992) “Historical Unemployment Series: A Comment,” Reviews in Economic
History 14: 377-86.
Leonard, Jonathan.  (1986) “The Effectiveness of Equal Employment Opportunity Law and Affirmative
Action Regulation.”  In Ronald Ehrenberg, ed., Research in Labor Economics 8: 319-50.
Leonard, Jonathan.  (1989) “Women and Affirmative Action,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 3
(Winter): 61-75.
Leonard, Jonathan.  (1990) “The Impact of Affirmative Regulation and Equal Employment Law on Black
Employment,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 4 (Fall): 47-63.
Lewis, H. Gregg.  (1963) Unionism and Relative Wages in the United States.  Chicago, IL: University
of Chicago Press.
Lewis, H. Gregg.  (1986) Union Relative Wage Effects: A Survey.  Chicago, IL: University of Chicago
Press.
Long, Clarence.  (1958) The Labor Force Under Changing Income and Employment.  Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press.
Margo, Robert A.  (1988) “Interwar Unemployment in the U.S.: Evidence from the 1940 Census
Sample.” In Barry Eichengreen and Timothy Hatton, eds., Interwar Unemployment in Historical
Perspective.  The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers: 325-52.
Margo, Robert A.  (1990a) “The Incidence and Duration of Employment: Some Long-Term Comparisons
Economics Letters 32 (March): 217-20.
Margo, Robert A.  (1990b) Race and Schooling in the South, 1880-1950: An Economic History.
Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Margo, Robert A.  (1993a) “The Labor Force Participation of Older Americans in 1900: Further Results,”
Explorations in Economic History 30 (October): 409-23.
Margo, Robert A.  (1993b) “Employment and Unemployment in the 1930s,” Journal of Economic
Perspectives 7 (Spring): 41-59.
Margo, Robert A.  (1995) “Explaining Black-White Wage Convergence, 1940-1950: The Role of the
Great Compression,” Industrial and Labor Relations Review 48 (April): 470-81.Marshall, Ray, and Marc Tucker.  (1992) Thinking for a Living: Education and the Wealth of
Nations.  New York: Basic Books.
Miller, Herman P.  (1955) Income of the American People, A Volume in the Census Monograph Series.
New York: John Wiley and Sons.
Miller, Herman P.  (1958) “Changes in the Industrial Distribution of Wages in the United States, 1939-
1949.”  In An Appraisal of the 1950 Census Income Data, Studies in Income and Wealth, Vol. 23.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Miller, Herman P.  (1966) Income Distribution in the United States.  Washington, D.C.: G.P.O.
Moen, Jon Roger.  (1987a) Essays on the Labor Force and Labor Force Participation Rates: The
United States from 1860 to 1950.  Ph.D. dissertation.  Department of Economics.  University of
Chicago.
Moen, Jon Roger.  (1987b) “The Labor of Older Men: A Comment,” Journal of Economic History 47
(September): 761-67.
Nelson, Daniel.  (1969) Unemployment Insurance: The American Experience, 1915-1935.  Madison,
WI: University of Wisconsin Press.
Nelson, Daniel.  (1975) Managers and Workers: Origins of the New Factory System in the United
States, 1880-1920.  Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press.
Ober, Harry.  (1948) “Occupational Wage Differentials, 1907-1947,” Monthly Labor Review (August):
127-34.
O’Neill, June.  (1990) “The Role of Human Capital in Earnings Differences between Black and White
Men,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 4 (Fall): 25-45.
O’Neill, June, and Solomon Polachek.  (1993) “Why the Gender Gap in Wages Narrowed in the 1980s,”
Journal of Labor Economics 11 (January): 205-28.
Owen, John.  (1976) “Workweeks and Leisure: An Analysis of Trends, 1948-1975,” Monthly Labor
Review 99 (August): 3-8.
Owen, John.  (1988) “Work-Time Reduction in the United States and Europe,” Monthly Labor Review
111 (December): 41-45.
Raff, Daniel.  (1988) “Wage Determination Theory and the Five-Dollar Day at Ford,” Journal of
Economic History 48 (June): 387-400.Ransom, Roger, and Richard Sutch.  (1986) “The Labor of Older Americans: Retirement of Men On and
Off the Job, 1870-1937,” Journal of Economic History 46 (March): 1-30.
Romer, Christina.  (1986a) “New Estimates of Prewar Gross National Product and Unemployment,”
Journal of Economic History 46 (June): 341-52.
Romer, Christina.  (1986b) ”Spurious Volatility in Historical Unemployment Data,” Journal of Political
Economy 94 (February): 1-37.
Sinclair, Upton.  (1906) The Jungle.  New York: Doubleday.
Slichter, Sumner H.  (1950) “Notes on the Structure of Wages,” Review of Economics and Statistics
32 (February): 80-91.
Smith, James P., and Michael P. Ward.  (1984) Women’s Wages and Work in the Twentieth Century.
Santa Monica, CA: The Rand Corporation.
Smith, James P., and Finis R. Welch.  (1989) “Black Economic Progress after Myrdal,” Journal of
Economic Literature 27 (June): 519-64.
Sundstrom, William.  (1990) “Was there a Golden Age of Flexible Wages? Evidence from Ohio
Manufacturing, 1892-1910,” Journal of Economic History 50 (June): 309-20.
Troy, Leo, and Neil Sheflin. (1985) U.S. Union Sourcebook.  West Orange, N.J.: IRDIS (Industrial
Relations Data and Information Services).
Ulman, Lloyd.  (1966) The Rise of the National Trade Unions.  Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press.
U.S. Commissioner of Labor.  (1905) Nineteenth Annual Report, 1904.  Wages and Hours of Labor.
Washington, D.C.: G.P.O.
U.S. Council of Economic Advisers.  (1992) The Economic Report of the President.  Washington, D.C.:
G.P.O. [cited as The Economic Report of the President].
U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.  (1993) National Income and Product
Accounts of the United States.  Vol. 1, 1929-58.  Washington, D.C.: G.P.O. [cited in text as
National Income and Product Accounts]
U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.  (1992) National Income and Product
Accounts of the United States.  Vol. 2, 1959-88.  Washington, D.C.: G.P.O. [cited as National
Income and Product Accounts]U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census.  (1914) Thirteenth Census of the United States,
1910.  Vol. IV.  Population.  Occupation Statistics.  Washington, D.C.: G.P.O.
U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census.  (1933) Fifteenth Census of the United States:
1930.  Population.  Vol. V.  Washington, D.C.: G.P.O.
U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census.  (1943) Sixteenth Census of the United States:
1940.  Population.  Vol. II: Characteristics of the Population.  Washington, D.C.: G.P.O.
U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census.  (1975) Historical Statistics of the United
States: Colonial Times to 1970.  Washington, D.C.: G.P.O. [cited as Historical Statistics (1975)]
U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census.  (1988) 1986 Annual Survey of Manufactures.
Washington, D.C.: G.P.O.
U.S. Department of Commerce and Labor, Bureau of the Census.  (1904) Special Reports: Occupations
at the Twelfth Census.  Washington, D.C.: G.P.O.
U.S. Department of Education. (1993) 120 Years of American Education: A Statistical Portrait.
Washington, D.C.: G.P.O.
U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.  (various years) Employment and Earnings.
Washington, D.C.: G.P.O. [cited as Employment and Earnings]
U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.  (1989) The Handbook of Labor Statistics.
Bulletin 2340.  Washington, D.C.: G.P.O.
U.S. Department of the Interior, Census Office.  (1883) Report on the Statistics of Wages in the
Manufacturing Industries by Joseph D. Weeks.  1880 Census.  Vol. 20.  Washington, D.C.: G.P.O.
Weir, David R.  (1992) “A Century of U.S. Unemployment, 1890-1990: Revised Estimates and Evidence
for Stabilization,” Research in Economic History 14: 301-346.
Whaples, Robert.  (1990) The Shortening of the American Work Week: An Economic and Historical
Analysis of its Context, Causes, and Consequences.  Ph.D. dissertation.  Department of Economics.
University of Pennsylvania.
Williamson, Jeffrey, and Peter Lindert.  (1980) American Inequality: A Macroeconomic History.  New
York: Academic Press.
Wright, Gavin.  (1990) “The Origins of American Industrial Success, 1879-1940,” American Economic
Review 80 (September): 651-68.Goldin, Biblio Notes -1-
BIBLIOGRAPHIC NOTES
The subject of labor in U.S. history is broad and varied and there is no single source that provides
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fine volumes and articles concerned with specialized topics in labor history, such as unions, hours of work,
retirement, the female work force, inequality, education and training, and unemployment.  There are also
countless books on the labor forces of firms and the memberships of unions, but they have not been used
extensively here.  Because history is about change, much of the history of the labor force is concerned with
groups that have had altered labor force participation rates or changed relative wages over time.  Thus the
labor force participation of women, the old, and the young, and disparities in earnings by race, gender, and
ethnicity have received the most attention.
The basic data on the labor force, wages, and hours can be found in U.S. Department of
Commerce, Bureau of the Census,  Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1970
(Washington, D.C., 1975), which is currently under revision (scheduled to appear as Historical Statistics
of the United States 2000).  In the absence of the updated version, researchers can consult volumes such
as U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, The Handbook of Labor Statistics, Bulletin
2340 (Washington, D.C., 1989), U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment and
Earnings (Washington, D.C., various years), and the various Current Population Reports that summarize
the Current Population Survey data on income and employment.  For educational and schooling statistics,
U.S. Department of Education, 120 Years of American Education: A Statistical Portrait  (Washington,
D.C., 1993) provides a useful updating of the data in Historical Statistics.Goldin, Biblio Notes -2-
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conventional U.S. government sources (such as those issued by the Bureau of Labor Statistics and the
Bureau of the Census), but that the pre-1940 data were constructed by various researchers.  The reason
concerns the fundamental shift in the late 1930s to standard concepts of the labor force and unemployment
and the expansion of the statistical agencies of the U.S. government.  Many of the pre-1940 series in
Historical Statistics are summaries of important data sources that can provide more detail, although one
must exercise caution in using the original sources since more recent research has often located errors and
substituted better data.  Among the more important of the original sources on wages and hours are M. Ada
Beney, Wages, Hours, and Employment in the United States, 1914-1936 (New York, 1936), Paul H.
Douglas, Real Wages in the United States: 1890-1926 (Boston, 1930), and Whitney Coombs, The
Wages of Unskilled Labor in Manufacturing Industries in the United States, 1890-1924 (New York,
1926).
A classic on the general subject, which also covers the entire history of labor in the nineteenth
century and provides many of the data series upon which historians and economists still rely, is Stanley
Lebergott,  Manpower in Economic Growth: The American Record since 1800 (New York, 1964).
Richard  Edwards, Contested Terrain: The Transformation of the Workplace in the Twentieth
Century (New York, 1979) is a worthy interpretive essay.  John Durand, The Labor Force in the United
States, 1890-1960 (New York, 1948) and Clarence Long, The Labor Force Under Changing Income
and Employment (Princeton, 1958) have been standard subjects on labor supply at about mid-century.
Durand’s volume deals with the many data issues that arose when the labor force and unemployment
constructs were instituted.  Both Durand and Long focus extensively on the female labor force, for evenGoldin, Biblio Notes -3-
at mid-century it was a locus of change.  Richard Freeman, “The Evolution of the American Labor Market,
1948-80,” in Martin Feldstein, ed., The American Economy in Transition (Princeton, 1980), 349-96,
provides a more recent treatment.
The twentieth century decline in weekly hours of work is described and analyzed in Robert
Whaples, The Shortening of the American Work Week: An Economic and Historical Analysis of its
Context, Causes, and Consequences, Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Economics, University of
Pennsylvania (1990).  The subjects of old age retirement, health, and leisure are comprehensively treated
in Dora Costa, The Evolution of Retirement: An American Economic History, 1880-1990 (Chicago,
1998).  Roger Ransom and Richard Sutch, “The Labor of Older Americans: Retirement of Men On and
Off the Job, 1870-1937,” Journal of Economic History 46 (1986), 1-30, presents a somewhat different
view of retirement and emphasizes that workers altered their occupations as they aged and moved into less
strenuous pursuits.
The twentieth century has witnessed rising retirement, greater education of the young, far less youth
employment, and considerably lower hours of work for all.  Women’s increased participation in the labor
force provides the only major increase in labor supply.  More importantly, the increase in the female labor
force fundamentally altered social relations.  The subjects of female participation and the gender gap in
earnings, as well as an analysis of why change occurred, are presented in Claudia Goldin, Understanding
the Gender Gap: An Economic History of American Women (New York, 1990).  James P. Smith, and
Michael P. Ward, Women’s Wages and Work in the Twentieth Century (Santa Monica, CA, 1984)
deals with many of the same subjects but is written more for economists.  The impact that increased female
labor force participation had on the economy is analyzed in Claudia Goldin, “The Female Labor Force andGoldin, Biblio Notes -4-
American Economic Growth: 1890 to 1980,” in Stanley Engerman and Robert Gallman, eds., Long-Term
Factors in American Economic Growth, Conference on Income and Wealth, vol. 51 (Chicago, 1986).
Union strength first rose and then fell in twentieth century America.  For a broad overview see the
updated classic, Foster Rhea Dulles and Melvyn Dubofsky, Labor in America: A History, Fifth edition
(Arlington Heights, IL, 1993).  Lloyd Ulman,  The Rise of the National Trade Unions.  (Cambridge, MA,
1966) still provides the best statement of why national trade unions are inevitable when goods markets
become national.  The impact unions have had on worker wages is analyzed in H. Gregg Lewis, Unionism
and Relative Wages in the United States (Chicago, 1963) and then thoroughly reanalyzed in his later
work Union Relative Wage Effects: A Survey (Chicago, 1986).
The functioning of the labor market in general is an unwieldy subject, but has been addressed in
several volumes mainly concerned with the evolution of internal labor markets and conscious personnel
policy.  A classic on the first subject is Peter B. Doeringer, and Michael J. Piore, Internal Labor Markets
and Manpower Analysis (Lexington, MA, 1971).  The latter subject is given a superb historical treatment
in Daniel Nelson, Managers and Workers: Origins of the New Factory System in the United States,
1880-1920 (Madison, WI, 1975).  On the response of managers and personnel policy to potential union
organizing,  see  Sanford  M.  Jacoby,  Employing  Bureaucracy:  Managers,  Unions,  and  the
Transformation of Work in American Industry, 1900-1945 (New York, 1985).  Whether or not the
labor market was once a “spot” market but is now replete with implicit (and explicit) contracts is the subject
of a wide literature.  Part of the subject concerns the possibility that certain industries pay higher than
market wages to their workers.  One of the earliest articles on the topic of interindustry wage differentials
is Donald Cullen, “The Interindustry Wage Structure: 1899-1950,” American Economic Review 46Goldin, Biblio Notes -5-
(1956), 353-69, which receives an updated treatment in Alan B. Krueger, and Lawrence H. Summers,
“Reflections on the Inter-Industry Wage Structure,” in Kevin Lang and Jonathan Leonard, eds.,
Unemployment and the Structure of Labor Markets (Oxford, Eng., 1987), 17-47.  Upton Sinclair, The
Jungle (New York, 1906) contains many insights about labor markets in general at the dawn of the
twentieth century, but the wheat of this journalistic novel must be separated from its abundant chaff.
The evolution of the concept of unemployment in the late nineteenth century is insightfully presented
in Alexander Keyssar, Out of Work: The First Century of Unemployment in Massachusetts (New
York, 1986), which also discusses unemployment rates in the early twentieth century.  The unemployment
series assembled by Stanley Lebergott for the 1890 to 1929 period, and enshrined in Historical Statistics,
is astutely questioned by Christina Romer, “Spurious Volatility in Historical Unemployment Data,” Journal
of Political Economy 94 (1986), 1-37, who provides an alternative series.  David R. Weir,  “A Century
of U.S. Unemployment, 1890-1990: Revised Estimates and Evidence for Stabilization,” Research in
Economic History 14 (1992), 301-346, defends the original method and offers yet another series.
The starting point for the notion that income inequality in the United States declined precipitously
sometime during the first half of the twentieth century is Simon Kuznets, Shares of Upper Income Groups
in Income and Savings (New York, 1953).  The subject is explored further in Claudia Goldin, and Robert
A. Margo, “The Great Compression: The Wage Structure in the United States at Mid-Century,” Quarterly
Journal of Economics 107 (1992), 1-34, which locates the compression of the wage structure in the
1940s.  The general subject of inequality in U.S. history is given a broad treatment in Jeffrey Williamson,
and Peter Lindert,  American Inequality: A Macroeconomic History ( New York, 1980), which argues
that inequality in income, wealth, and wages first rose before it declined in the twentieth century.  TheGoldin, Biblio Notes -6-
subject of inequality is afforded more attention during periods of widening incomes and thus the literature
has burgeoned of late.  Among the many papers written on the topic in the past twenty years is Lawrence
F. Katz, and Kevin M. Murphy, “Changes in Relative Wages, 1963-87: Supply and Demand Factors,”
Quarterly Journal of Economics 107 (1992), 35-78, which clearly sets forth the late twentieth century
changes and some of its causes.
A related subject concerns the decline in black and white income differences during the past half
century.  James P. Smith, and Finis R. Welch,  “Black Economic Progress after Myrdal,” Journal of
Economic Literature 27 (1989), 519-64, provides the basic data and defends the notion that educational
progress was responsible for a large portion of the decrease in racial inequality of incomes from 1940 to
1980.  Robert A. Margo, Race and Schooling in the South, 1880-1950: An Economic History
(Chicago, 1990) details the segregated educational system of the South that originally gave rise to large
differences in schooling.  John H. Donohue III, and James P. Heckman, “Continuous Versus Episodic
Change: The Impact of Civil Rights Policy on the Economic Status of Blacks,” Journal of Economic
Literature 29 (1991), 1603-43, questions whether changes in educational quantity and quality could have
played a major role in the narrowing of the differences between black and white incomes.  John Bound,
and Richard Freeman, “What Went Wrong? The Erosion of Relative Earnings and Employment among
Young Black Men in the 1980s,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 107 (1992), 201-32, details the
widening of the gap between black and white incomes in the most recent decade.
Increased educational attainment in the twentieth century affected the labor force in several ways.
It decreased the labor force participation rate of youth, it allowed women to enter the white-collar labor
force and thus work when married, and it, most importantly, gave the labor force greater skills.  For muchGoldin, Biblio Notes -7-
of the twentieth century, the most important educational change was the expansion of secondary schooling.
The rise of the American high school and of secondary education is discussed in Claudia Goldin,
“America’s Graduation from High School: The Evolution and Spread of Secondary Schooling in the
Twentieth Century,” Journal of Economic History 58 (1998).  The literature on other aspects of
government  and  the  labor  market,  such  as  social  security,  unemployment  insurance,  workers’
compensation, and the minimum wage, is left for the chapter on government.